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The clouds are white in a pale autumn sky. 
    J.H. Prynne, The Oval Window 
2 
 
Espèce de soleils!  tu songes: Voyez-les,  
Ces pantins morphinés … 
    Jules Laforgue, “Encore ￠ cet astre” 
     
a cloudless sky 
    J.H. Prynne, Word Order 
3 
 
 
1 The argument of this commentary on J.H. Prynne’s “Again in the Black 
Cloud” has been presented in various public fora: first at the department of 
English  and  Related  Literatures,  University  of  York,  England  (at  the 
invitation  of  Jim  Mays);  at  the  Alice  Berlin  Kaplan  Center  for  the 
Humanities, Northwestern University; in seminars on “Reading Poetry” and 
“Modern  Poetry”  at  Stonehill  College,  and  most  recently  as  a  keynote 
address  to  the  Graduate  Student  English  Colloquium  on  “Vernal 
Temporalities” at Brooklyn College, CUNY in 2008. 
2  J.H.  Prynne,  The  Oval  Window  (Cambridge,  1983),  29,  rpd  in  Poems 
(Newcastle  upon  Tyne, 1999), 334.  In  all  cases  quotations  from  Prynne’s 
oeuvre will be to the original collected edition followed by its republication in 
Poems, hence The Oval Window (29 / 334) hereafter cited in text. 
3  J.H. Prynne,  Word  Order  (Kenilworth:  Prest  Roots  Press,  1989),  12  and 
Poems, 365. GLOSSATOR 2 
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I 
 
Attending a session of the MLA in Washington in 2000, I listened to 
Charles Altieri deliver a presentation on the reading of J.H. Prynne’s 
poetry entitled “An Aspect of Prynne’s Poetics: Autonomy as a Lyric 
Ideal.”
4 A striking feature of Altieri’s presentation was the manner in 
which he would occasionally pause and comment on the number of 
times he had to quote from the poetry in order to proceed after each 
point – for each point was curiously large yet articulated through the 
local, often the linguistic local called the particle – before adding: “We 
used to do this a lot,” that is, we professionals of literary reading used 
to comment on the poetry of our attention frequently once upon a time; 
and further: “It’s as if this kind of poetry is written for this kind of 
reading. That doesn’t happen any more.” If I am not mistaken in my 
recollection, Altieri was having fun. We all know the once upon a time 
world of New Criticism implied by Alteri’s aside just as we all know 
the critiques to which it has been subject and the subsequent openings 
in academic culture which are now regarded as acquisitions, which is 
to say irreversible, if not unthinkably so. Altieri, like Prynne, received 
his formation during the heyday of New Criticism, but neither is, nor 
has  ever  been,  a  devotee  of  New  Criticism,  for  neither  has  ever 
confused the act, the reflexive act of close reading, with the particular 
formalism and limited ontology of New Criticism; indeed, both are 
readers of historical and formal sophistication for whom poetry is an 
epistemological  and  ontological  performance  in  a  decidedly  non-
foundationalist mode and hence an activity characterized by a certain 
kind of openness and opening. If, as Altieri said, “It’s as if this kind of 
poetry  is  written  for  this  kind  of  reading,”  the  question  becomes, 
“What is the kind of reading involved?” in relation to “What kind of 
poetry? And: What kind of poetic experience is it that commands the 
reading process, that is, which commands  not only  responsiveness 
but acts of attention?” This is where Altieri’s concern with autonomy 
enters,  the  idea  that  Prynne’s  poetry,  the  difficulty  of  which  has 
become all but fetishized,
5 resists certain approaches, resists, indeed, 
 
4  This  presentation  was  subsequently  published  as  Charles  Altieri,  “An 
Aspect of Prynne’s Poetics: Autonomy as a Lyric Ideal,”  The Gig, no. 10 
(December 2001), 38-51.  
5 Whence the need for a return to the simplicity of a Douglas Oliver who, in 
his own opening and tentative reading of the poem “Of Movement Towards 
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certain methods – indeed, resists as vulgar the very idea of method – 
and  compels  the  reader  to  search  for,  to  uncover  processes  of 
attending uncharacteristic to procedures become habituations, and in 
so doing  becomes  an allegory for a conception  of autonomy. The 
autonomy  enacted  through  Prynne’s  poetry  is  not,  however,  the 
autonomy  of  Adorno’s  Critical  Theory,  as  many  would  have  one 
believe. To capture, to begin to articulate the modes and models of 
autonomy at work in Prynne’s poetry and poetics would indeed, pace 
Altieri, be to begin to grasp what it means to say that “this kind of 
poetry is written for this kind of reading,” that is, a poetic movement 
for which the manner of approach is the commentary whose focus is 
a  highly  delimited  –  object  of  commentary  –  yet  motivated  and 
reflexive  movement,  hence  making  of  all  relations  not  merely 
relations  to  be  uncovered  but  relations  to  be  construed.  The 
problematic of an early formalist aesthetic such as one finds it in the 
poet-thinker Pierre Reverdy’s conception of Cubism, that is, that art 
constructs new relations, relations which are not to be found in the 
world before or independent of artistic vision – let us call this the core 
of  an  essentially  constructivist  vision  –  and  it  is  this  which  is  the 
meaning of autonomy, such a conception and its terms are no longer 
Prynne’s.  There  is  indeed  a  question  of  the  status  of  newness  in 
Prynne’s  poetic  thought,  and  it  is  based  in  part  upon  the 
understanding of relations. There is, though, no trace of the Kantian 
“Analytic of the Beautiful” in Prynne’s poetics, and thus there is no 
conception  of  a  formalism  divorced  from  bodily  experience  and 
thereby desire as is made clear when Kant introduces the conception 
of disinterested perception:  
 
The satisfaction that we combine with the representation of 
the existence of an object is called interest. Hence such a 
satisfaction always has at the same time a relation to the 
 
a Natural Place” from Wound Response, observed that “J.H. Prynne’s poetry 
has sometimes been dismissed by reviewers who think that confessing their 
own lack of understanding permits them the arrogance of blind attack. But it 
has sometimes been stoutly defended by those who, understanding perhaps 
fitfully, have made his poetry’s difficulty or obscurity into a virtue,” before 
insisting that “the best way to restore a decent public discussion of Prynne’s 
work  is  to  insist  upon  the  most  bald  and  obvious  role  of  its  meanings.” 
Douglas Oliver, “J.H. Prynne’s ‘Of Movement Toward a Natural Place’,” 
Grosseteste Review, vol. 12, 1979, 93.  GLOSSATOR 2 
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faculty of desire, either as its determining ground or else as 
necessarily  interconnected  with  its  determining  ground. 
But if the question is whether something is beautiful, one 
does not want to know whether there is anything that is or 
that could be at stake, for us or for someone else, in the 
existence of the thing, but rather how we judge in mere 
contemplation (intuition or reflection).
 6 
 
For Kant, distinctively aesthetic pleasure is not bodily and so cannot 
entertain the desire through which something “could be at stake, for us 
or  for  someone  else,  in  the  existence  of  the  thing.”  Likewise  for 
Reverdy,  as  revealed  in  his  correspondence  with  the  young  poet-
thinker  André  Breton,  the  body  is  to  be  minimized  so  that  “the 
emotion for which you seek in a work is that which you have created 
yourself,” hence, in the same passage, Reverdy’s principled rejection 
of  any  notion  of  metamorphosis  since  this  implies  something  pre-
existant “and that is why there is talk of ellipsis. NO! There is no 
metamorphosis  –  there  is  synthesis,  creation.”
7  Of  course,  as  would 
become clear within only three years (1922) since the composition of 
this  letter  (1919),  there  could  be  no  Surrealism  without 
metamorphosis, for everything in Surrealist experience depends to a 
high degree upon an aisthesis of metamorphosed relations – and yes, I 
shall be making comparisons between the poetics of a Prynne and the 
poetics  of  a  Breton  –  from  that  of  the  threshold  of 
dream/wakefulness,  the  relations  between  old  and  new  (or  the 
démodé  in  the  new  as  Walter  Benjamin  grasped  it  through 
Surrealism),  to  larger  relations  between  the  everyday  and  the 
cosmological. In Prynne’s poetry, these relations can be economic and 
political  (Kitchen  Poems,  1968,  say,  but  also  Brass,  1971  and  Bands 
Around the Throat, 1987), anthropological (“A Note on Metal,” 1968), 
ethnographic  (as  with  News  of  Warring  Clans,  1977),  lyrical  and 
alchemical (The White Stones, 1969; A Night Square, 1971; The Land of 
 
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, transs. Paul Guyer and Eric 
Matthews (Cambridge: C.U.P., 2000), 90. 
7  Pierre Reverdy to André Breton, letter of 5 January 1919, quoted in 
Marguerite Bonnet,  André Breton: Naissance de l’aventure surréaliste (Paris: José 
Corti, 1975), 132. Cf. Michael Stone-Richards, “Nominalism and Emotion in 
Reverdy’s Account of Cubism, 1917-1927,” in Malcolm Gee, ed., Art Criticism 
Since 1900 (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1993), 
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Saint Martin
8), scientific (The Oval Window, 1983; High Pink on Chrome, 
1975), imaginal and oneiric (Into the Day, 1972), imaginal and medical 
(High  Pink  on  Chrome,  1975),  biological  (“The  Plant  Time  Manifold 
Transcripts,” 1974), or medico-experimental, as with Wound Response 
(1974).  It  remains,  though,  that  always  at  issue  are  questions  of 
newness and subjection the basis of which are states of embodiment 
marked  by  dispossession  which  serve  to  problematize  the  subjective 
appropriation of experience. 
  The question of newness – which for Prynne is not du Nouveau – 
cannot be avoided in the understanding of the model of autonomy 
pertinent to this poetics, for which emergence (sudden or otherwise) 
would be a preferable term, and it is through this that we shall come 
directly to the poetry of Wound Response and in particular the poem 
“Again in the Black Cloud” as the object of our commentary. From 
Jena Romanticism onward, the new is not the modern, and to imagine 
the new is necessarily to conceive (and to imagine) generation from 
the old. The Schlegel brothers spoke of the “Kampf des Alten und 
des Neuen” (the struggle of the old and the new), not of the ancients 
and  the  moderns  as  well-established  English  colloquialism  would 
have it. And this is important, for the issue in the development of 
Friedrich Schlegel’s theory of Romanticism is the possibility that old 
and new are properly anthropological categories, that is, constitutive 
of  the  human  mind.  We  see  the  after  life  (Nachleben)  of  this 
profoundly Jena Romantic thinking in the Modernist conception of 
the  archaic  –  in  an  Eliot,  a  Joyce,  a  Benjamin  no  less  than  the 
principal  practitioners  of  Surrealism  and,  today,  in  the  work  of  a 
Prynne. The new is what is archaic, or more tellingly, that which is 
latent, and so in a powerful sense timeless, precisely in the way in 
which, on the Freudian account, the unconscious is said to be zeitlos: 
without time, which German term has been translated by the French 
psycho-analyst  Pierre  Fédida  as  passé  anachronique  [lit.  anachronised 
past],  that  is,  a  movement  which  anachronises  tense  and  undoes 
syntactic  governance  to  make  pastness  a  permanently  available 
present. As I have said, this is the view of Walter Benjamin who finds 
authority for it in Surrealism; it is, too, the view of Eliot in his 1923 
essay “’Ulysses,’ Order and Myth” which identifies in the method of 
Joyce’s Ulysses “a continuous parallel between contemporaneity and 
 
8 The Land of Saint Martin, first published in  Poems (Edinburgh: Agneau 2, 
1982). GLOSSATOR 2 
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antiquity.” Indeed, Eliot, here very much the disciple of Baudelaire, 
goes  on  to  argue  that  “Psychology  […],  ethnology  […]  have 
concurred to make possible what was impossible even a few years 
ago.  Instead  of  narrative  method,  we  may  now  use  the  mythical 
method. It is, I seriously believe, a step toward making the modern 
world possible for art,” which is to say, available for the historical, 
reflexive  consciousness  which  is  a  moving  form  made  of 
sedimentations and relationalities, embodied temporalities. Subjection, 
that is, as Hegelian process. 
  What, then, is the emergent new, and what does it mean to say 
that  the  new,  not  being  merely  the  modern  (an  ideological  term, 
here), can only be conceived, imagined, in relation to the latent? Here 
we need to think in terms of theories of creativity: where creativity is 
thought of as the creation, bringing into the world of something that 
did not previously exist (this might be a version of Romanticism); or 
in terms of combination, where creativity is conceived in terms of the 
exploration of the structural properties of a medium (Baroque music, 
for  example).  The  new  cannot  be  held  apart  from  accounts  of 
creativity. In one sense, it is a perfectly obvious, even banal thing to 
identify  the  new  with  firstness  –  but  firstness  of  what?  Medium? 
Object? Even in the creation story of the Hebrew Bible God creates 
out of the stuff of the earth – dust in the language of the King James 
Bible – whilst in the Gospel according to John the Word (Logos) was 
with  God.  In  other  words,  in  the  two  most  influential  creation 
accounts in the western tradition, creation and newness are relational 
forms, and I should like to suggest that they are relational forms in an 
interesting way, that is, that they are underwrit by passivity, and it is 
through the conception of passivity appropriate to Prynne’s poetry 
that we shall arrive at an adequate comprehension of autonomy, for 
we  shall  see  a  thinking  in  which  the  mythical  method  (Eliot  and 
Joyce)  becomes  transformed,  made  continuous  with  a  medical 
approach in which, as we shall come to see, the conception of agency 
and  feeling  implied  by  the  rich  thinking  of  relation  is  not  one 
uniquely or even distinctively identified with a personal subject. A 
conception of agency is explored in the poetic experience of Prynne’s 
oeuvre for which Wound Response, a middle period work, became the 
summation and model. Autonomy in the poetic infra-phenomenology 
deployed in this work is not an ideal but a model…and as such itself 
creative  in  the  sense  of  generative  –  or  projective  –  of  its  own 
possibilities. 
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II 
 
Here,  death  borders  on  birth.  Not  the  birth  which  has 
always already taken place, but the birth in the course of 
being  produced  [en  train  de  se  produire].  In  hypnosis, 
death and birth are not past (they are not present qua past), 
but they are becoming past. 
  The essential determination of the state of passivity 
itself has a model, in truth more than a model: it is the 
state of the child in the body of its mother. 
    Jean-Luc Nancy, “Identité et tremblement”
9 
 
I should now like to go to this concern, this problematic of passivity, 
passivity  as  that  which  precedes,  which  is  separate  from  man’s 
intentional activities and which in being so compels the re-thinking of 
agency, and I shall do so through a consideration of Prynne’s “Again 
in the Black Cloud” from Wound Response. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 
 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, “Identité et tremblement,” in Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, Eric 
Michaud and Jean-Luc Nancy, Hypnoses (Paris: Galilée, 1984), 32. GLOSSATOR 2 
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Fig. 2 
 
The volume Wound Response was published in 1974 in an edition of 
four hundred copies by Street Editions, Cambridge. It comes with a 
plain, austere appearance: black lettering in Times New Roman on 
covers of white shiny (even glassy or hyaline) ground with a single 
rectangular  band  of  purple  red  on  the  cover  [fig.  1].  There  are 
thirteen poems between pages 5 and 21 and a final prose work, “The 
Plant Time Manifold Transcripts,” between pages 24 (the title page) and 
32. The book opens on an epigraph in prose the title of which is 
given with date, page number, but no author, as follows: 
 
“Of  particular  interest  in  the  present  context  are  the 
observations made on patients whose middle ear had been 
opened in such a way that a cotton electrode soaked in the Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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normal saline solution could be placed near the cochlea. A 
total of 20 surgically operated ears were studied. Eleven 
patients heard pure tones whose pitch corresponded to the 
frequency  of  the  sinusoidal  voltage  applied  to  the 
electrode….One patient reported gustatory sensations.” 
               Touch, Heat and Pain (1966), p.11
10 
 
The work from which the epigraph is taken, as is easily established, is 
the publication of the proceedings of a scientific symposium of the 
Ciba Foundation held in 1965: Touch, Heat and Pain. A Ciba Foundation 
Symposium, edited by A.V.S. de Reuck and Julie Knight (pp. xiii + 389, 
124  illustrations,  295  references)  with  simultaneous  publication  in 
Boston (Little and Brown) and London (J. and A. Churchill) in 1966. 
It is useful, indeed, invaluable, to gain a sense of the contemporary 
response of professional scientists to this publication, for therein we 
shall find the first cues as to the nature, level and kind of engagement 
that is Wound Response. For example, for W. Ritchie Russell, in a one 
paragraph review: 
 
This volume reports the proceedings of a symposium held 
in  September  1965.  The  anatomy  and  physiology  of 
sensation are both still, in many respects, most obscure, but 
the  development  of  electron  microscopy  has  at  least 
contributed  knowledge  regarding  the  structure  of  nerve 
endings.  Professor  Lowenstein,  as  Chairman  of  this 
Symposium, referred to the proceedings as a beginning of a 
conversation  between  the  two  populations  of  nerve  cells  –  the 
peripheral  and  the  central.  All  interested  in  research  on 
sensation should study this volume.
11 
 
For Russell, then, it is the obscurity of the anatomy and physiology of 
sensation that warrants the attention of both scientist and reader and, 
it is suggested, given the obscurity it is, in the interim, as it were, 
fortunate that “the development of electron microscopy has at least 
 
10  Epigraph  to  J.H.  Prynne,  Wound  Response  (Cambridge:  Street  Editions, 
1974). All subsequent references to Wound Response will be in text as WR 3 / 
215 followed by page number to the first collected edition then Poems. 
11 W. Ritchie Russell, review of Touch, Heat and Pain, in Proceedings of the Royal 
Society of Medicine, vol. 60 (March 1967), 312. My emphases. GLOSSATOR 2 
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contributed  knowledge  regarding  the  structure  of  nerve  endings,” 
which is to say, that the mechanism of magnification has provided a 
type and degree of measure for the exploration of the problem of 
sensation.  The  magnification  of  the  nerve  cells  by  electron 
microscopy  makes  observable  the  matter  the  problem  of  which 
remains most obscure. In the mean time, the proceedings, pace its chair, 
Professor Lowenstein, has set up the terms for the “beginning of a 
conversation  between  the  two  populations  of  nerve  cells  –  the 
peripheral and the central,” which would be a conversation across 
part  of  the  autonomous  nervous  system,  whether  in  humans  or 
animals, whence Michael Jukes contemporaneous review commenting 
on “Quilliam’s summary of the structure of organized receptors in the 
beaks, snouts and sex-organs of a wide variety  of animals [which] 
demonstrates how much comparative physiology needs to be done.”
 
12 Jukes had opened his review by observing that “The title [Touch, 
Heat and Pain] is rather misleading. The subjects covered range from 
biophysics to psychophysics, but most papers deal with the structure 
and function of mechano-receptors and the impulse patterns which 
they produce in afferent fibres.”
13 After specifying the range of the 
approaches covered in the symposium which the title may not suggest 
–  biophysics  and  psychophysics  –  Jukes  identifies  one  of  the  core 
concerns of the symposium and book, namely “thermoreceptors and 
the pain caused by chemicals applied to blister wounds and heat.”
14 
Anatomy,  experimental  physiology,  biophysics  and  psychophysics 
centered upon the problem of pain through experimentally induced 
wounds:  these  are  the  scientific  subjects  of  the  Ciba  Foundation 
symposium and book on Touch, Heat and Pain.
15 There is, however, 
one other contemporaneous review that is worthy of mention, and it 
is one which takes the reader of  Wound Response to the heart of the 
matter, and it is by Ruth E. Bowden, for whom the main field of 
inquiry is “the biophysical aspects of sensory function,” before adding 
the simple but telling observation that  
 
12 Michael Jukes, review of Touch, Heat and Pain, in Experimental Physiology, vol. 
52 (January 1967), 100. 
13 Michael Jukes, ibid. 
14 Michael Jukes, ibid. 
15  …  and  zoology.  The  parody  scientific  discourse  that  shapes  the 
presentation of “The Plant-Time Manifold Transcripts” which concludes Wound 
Response clearly takes the transcripts of discussions following each paper in 
Touch, Heat and Pain as the model for a type of colloquy. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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The psychophysical approach is of particular importance 
since  man  is  the  only  animal  capable  of  describing  his 
perceptions.  It  has  also  led  to  constructive  attempts  to 
quantify the apparent intensity of one sensory modality in 
terms  of  another.  Cross-matching  of  modalities  suggests 
that each perceptual continuum has a typical exponent the 
value of which is modified by changes in the parameters of 
experimental conditions.
16 
 
  If the scientists participating in the Ciba Foundation symposium 
on  Touch,  Heat  and  Pain  are  extremely  aware  of  the  difficulty  of 
measuring  any  form  of  sensation  –  still  less  pain,  something 
evidenced in their many discussions on the problem of cross-modality 
matching – there is almost no awareness that the problem, in terms of 
their own concepts and preoccupations, may also be irretrievably one 
of language “since man is the only animal capable of describing his 
perceptions.” The chair of this symposium, Professor Loewenstein, in 
the  discussion  following  S.S.  Stevens’  presentation  on  “Transfer 
Function of the Skin and Muscle Senses,” the paper from which the 
epigraph to Wound Response is taken, begins his response by observing: 
 
I  have  always  had  difficulties  in  understanding  what 
psychologists and psycho-physicists meant by their various 
functions. I have a better “feel” now after hearing Professor 
Stevens’ explanation of the processes involved in matching. 
This  is  obviously  rather  complex.  Let  us  try  to  make  a 
simple  breakdown.  There  is  differentiation  first  at  the 
transducer  level  –  probably  two  steps  of  differentiation 
enter at this level; then there is differentiation again at the 
various synaptic levels. Then something most complicated 
enters:  a  matching  process  of  cumulative  events,  a 
“memory” process. And all this is embraced by a power 
function which relates the external energy input to the final 
step of the chain.
17 
 
 
16 Ruth E. Bowden, review of Touch, Heat and Pain, in Journal of Anatomy, vol. 
103, part 1 (June 1968), 184. 
17 “Discussion,” in Touch, Heat and Pain, 21. GLOSSATOR 2 
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One  can  hear  the  poetry  enter  into  the  diction  of  Professor 
Loewenstein as he muses aloud, “Then something most complicated 
enters: a matching process of cumulative events, a ‘memory’ process,” 
as the differentiated levels between synaptic and transducers – that is 
to say, levels of transfer, passage and communication – encode and 
embody the qualitative movements called memory whose use cannot 
avoid  the  self-aware  form  taken  by  communication,  namely 
language.
18 We see this in the poem “Again in the Black Cloud” in an 
itemized passage: 
 
18 Might the poem “Thanks for the Memory” (the Rainger and Robin song 
aside) be in part a response to the query, the problem articulated by Professor 
Loewenstein? 
 
Thanks for the Memory 
 
An increase in the average quantity 
of transmitter (or other activating substance 
released from the VRS) arriving 
at the postsynaptic side over an extended 
period of time (minutes to days) should lead 
to an augmentation in the number of receptor sites 
and an expansion of the postsynaptic 
receptor region, through conversion of receptor 
monomers into receptor 
polymers and perhaps some increase in 
the synthesis of monomers. [None 
of these ideas bears upon the 
chemical basis for depolarization 
induced by acquisition 
             of transmitter 
             by receptor. 
             There is evidence 
 
Wound Response, 9 / 220. Justin Katko of Queens’ College, Cambridge, has 
informed  me  that  the  title  of  Prynne’s  “Thanks  for  the  Memory”  is  an 
allusion  to  Edward  M.  Kosower,  “A  Molecular  Basis  for  Learning  and 
Memory,”  Proceedings  of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  vol.  69,  no.  11 
(November 1972), 3292-3296. Mr Katko was also gracious enough to share a 
copy  of  this  article  with  me,  for  which  I  extend  my  thanks  for  the  new 
memory.  The  opening  of  Kosower’s  article echoes  the  concerns  of  Touch, 
Heat and Pain in the terms of that I have argued, namely, the constructive 
value of obscurity where questions are fundamental: “In spite of considerable 
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          Air to blood 
        are the two signs, flushed with the sound: 
          (a) “tended to refrain from aimless wandering” 
          (b) “experienced less dizziness” 
          (c) “learned to smile a little” 
          (d) “said they felt better and some indeed 
                seemed happier” (WR 20 / 230). 
 
These would be memories – may be even fictions of memories – but 
with  the  pronominal  shifter  suppressed  (I,  he,  she,  it,  they)  they 
become  themselves  actions  as  any  hierarchy  between  transducer, 
synapse  and  environment  becomes  regulatively  indistinct.  The 
problem  being  addressed  by  Professor  Loewenstein  is  that  of  the 
processes involved in matching, or, more precisely, the problem of cross-
matching  modalities.  Here,  for  example,  is  the  opening  of  S.S. 
Stevens’ paper, again, the paper from which Wound Response takes its 
epigraph: 
 
Nature has tuned the sense organs to respond to aspects of 
the enveloping universe in such a way that each modality 
has a uniqueness not shared by any of the others. Taste is 
different from touch; warmth is different from smell; light 
is different from sound. Efforts to understand the operation 
of the senses have concentrated mainly on their qualitative 
aspects, and attempts to explain have been framed largely 
in  terms  of  specific  neural  pathways.  The  doctrine  of 
specific nerve energies was Johannes Müller’s contribution 
to this qualitative endeavour. The sensory systems tell us 
not only about quality, but also about quantity.
19 
 
 
effort […], our understanding of learning and memory is still rather limited.” 
Edward Kosower, ibid, 3292. Noteworthy in this article, is its use of electron 
micrographs matching the use of the new electron microscopy of Touch, Heat 
and Pain as model for Wound Response, that is, the use of magnification to make 
accessible  what  would  otherwise  be  beyond  the  terms  of  human 
measurement  as  one  of  the  principle  parameters  of  Prynne’s  developing 
poetics for which Wound Response is the determining form going forward. 
19 S.S. Stevens, “Transfer Functions of the Skin and Muscle Senses,” in Touch, 
Heat and Pain, 3. GLOSSATOR 2 
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Scientific measurement, it is understood, cannot be about uniqueness 
(“The sensory systems tell us not only about quality”), hence Stevens, 
whilst  acknowledging  the  import  of  accounts  of  the  senses  which 
stress  the  qualitative,  chooses  to  concentrate  on  the  quantitative 
aspects  of  sensation  for  it  is  there  that  the  kinds  of  account  of 
measurement  valorized  can  be  practiced.  Stevens’  own  account, 
however,  stresses  the  uniqueness  of  each  sense  in  relation  to  “the 
enveloping  universe,”  and  it  was  already  known  that  all  living 
systems  develop  distinctive  memories  and  memory  paths  which, 
through  the  principle  of  feedback  (then  being  conceptualized  by 
Cybernetics)  foregrounded  the  autonomy  of  sub-systems  within 
larger homeostatic balances. The problem for Stevens – articulated by 
Loewenstein in the ensuing discussion of his paper – will be exactly 
the problem stemming from the uniqueness of each sense for which a 
quantitative approach could not in principle be a solution. Indeed, 
there is a poem by Prynne called “Quality in that Case as Pressure” 
from  the  earlier  collection  The  White  Stones  (1969)  which  precisely 
addresses  Stevens’  problem  of  quantity  by  asserting  the 
transformation of quality under certain conditions into quantity: 
 
Presence in this condition is quality 
which can be transformed & is subject 
even to paroxysm – but  it is not 
lapse: that is the chief point. As I 
move with my weight there is collusion, 
with the sight  of how we would rise 
or fall on the level. 
 
When the language of the poem moves to that of one who is  
 
seen to stumble & who falls with joy, unhurt. 
Or who hurries on, on some pavement, the 
sublate crystal locked for each step. 
They aim their faces but also bear them 
and have cloth next to most of their skin
20 
 
 
20 J. H. Prynne, “Quality in that Case as Pressure,” The White Stones (Lincoln: 
Grosseteste Pres, 1969), 50 / Poems, 78. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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as readers we find ourselves back upon the terrain of Wound Response: 
the transfer functions of the skin and muscles senses (Charles Olson’s 
proprioception in a more materialist conceptuality), the question (and 
problem)  of  mechanisms  of  transfer  of  energy  from  one  kind  and 
form  to  another  (“the  /  sublate  crystal  locked  for  each  step”),  the 
threat of a bruise contre-coup as liminal trigger to an état secondaire 
(“the  person  who  can  be  /  seen  to  stumble  &  who  falls  with  joy, 
unhurt”)  as  presented  in  “Of  Movement  toward  a  Natural  Place” 
which opens on the scene of injury barely coincident with the time of 
recognition – as though as one falls down the stairs one scarcely has 
time to think I am falling … “but it is not / lapse” –  
 
See him recall the day by moral trace, a squint 
  to cross-fire shewing fear of hurt at top left; the  
  bruise is glossed by “nothing much” but drains 
  to deep excitement.  His recall is false but the charge 
  is still there in neural space, pearly blue with a 
  touch of crimson    (WR 12 / 223) 
 
the resulting actions of which will “make sense right at the contre-
coup.” Similar actions and paroxysms are explored in “Quality in that 
Case as Pressure” where the suggestion of contre-coup  (the “cross-
fire shewing fear of hurt at top left”) is conveyed in the verses 
 
                As I 
  move with my weight there is collusion 
 
amongst  things,  objects,  processes  and  qualities,  but  which  I  also 
construe  as  a  tacit  rime  with  contusion.  It  is  the  collusion  amongst 
things, processes and senses that makes it all but impossible for there 
to be any quantitative solution to the problem of processes involving 
matching, that indeed makes all sense processes necessarily modalities 
of  cross-matching.  Now,  the  other  and  much  older  word  for  this 
phenomenon of cross-matching modalities is synaesthesia – but it is 
no longer the synaesthesia treated by the older tradition of Symbolist 
and late-Symbolist thought as found, say, in a Pater or Kandinsky 
and Schönberg - and it is here that the epigraph to Wound Response 
begins to foreground the poetic problematic which rides upon and 
through the apparently materialist language of medico-experimental 
science, and for which neurology will become a privileged field in GLOSSATOR 2 
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Prynne’s  oeuvre  and  poetics,  namely,  the  problem  of  equivalent 
descriptions.  
  Let us return to the epigraph form Touch, Heat and Pain: 
   
“Of  particular  interest  in  the  present  context  are  the 
observations made on patients whose middle ear had been 
opened in such a way that a cotton electrode soaked in the 
normal saline solution could be placed near the cochlea. A 
total of 20 surgically operated ears were studied. Eleven 
patients heard pure tones whose pitch corresponded to the 
frequency  of  the  sinusoidal  voltage  applied  to  the 
electrode….One patient reported gustatory sensations.” 
        Touch, Heat and Pain (1966), p.11
21 
    
With a cotton electrode soaked in normal saline solution placed near 
the  cochlea,  “Eleven  patients  heard  pure  tones  whose  pitch 
corresponded to the frequency of the sinusoidal voltage applied to the 
electrode,” followed by the poetry’s [not Stevens’] ellipses, and then 
the  flat,  very  flat  report  that  “One  patient  reported  gustatory 
sensations.” Just one, and that one patient (the quantitative exception) 
will  be  the  threshold  –  the  exergue  –  to  the  poetic  experience  of 
Wound Response as the synaesthesia of hearing and taste opens onto a 
liminal world of latency, suspension, reversibilities (in all forms made 
possible  by  cross-matching  modalities)  characterized  by  de-
substantialization  as  the  world  of  sound  becomes  a  model  for 
movement and apperception and further cross-matching of perception 
consistent with the hypothesis that every living organ / organism not 
only develops memory paths unique to it but may as a result develop 
unforeseen  possibilities  as  a  result  of  the  feedback  effects  of  its 
autonomy. The Central Nervous System is the figure – and fact – of 
this thinking and possibility, implicitly so in  The White Stones, fully 
thematised as model in Wound Response, and thereafter part of the reflex 
in  this  developing  oeuvre  as  we  can  see,  for  example,  in  The  Oval 
Window  where  we  find  an  opening  verse  that  says,  “It  is  a  CNS 
depressant. Endless sorrow / rises from the misty waves.” (The Oval 
Window,  31  /  336)  Consider,  then,  in  this  light,  the  poem  which 
 
21  Epigraph  to  J.H.  Prynne,  Wound  Response  (Cambridge:  Street  Editions, 
1974), 3, Poems, 215. All subsequent references to Wound Response will be in 
text as WR followed by page number and page number to Poems. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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follows the blank page following the epigraph to the collection, the 
poem “Treatment in the Field.” The blank page between epigraph 
and poem is crucial, for the turning of the page onto left blank field 
(3-4) with the eyes moving from left to right (4-5) enacts measurement 
of absence and symptomatology, something to which we shall return 
below. Following the epigraph, following the blank page, “Treatment 
in the Field.” 
 
 
III 
 
TREATMENT IN THE FIELD 
 
Through the window the sky clears 
  and in sedate attachment stands the order of battle, 
      quiet as a colour chart and bathed 
    by threads of hyaline and gold leaf. 
   The brietal perfusion makes a controlled 
   amazement and trustingly we walk there, speak 
      fluently on the same level of sound; 
white murmur ferries the clauses to the true 
      centre of the sleep forum. The river 
     glints in harmony, by tribute from the darker 
      folds of that guttural landscape which 
lie drawn up under our touch. Blue-green to yellow 
    in memory beyond the gold number: the 
  tones and sweetness confuse in saline. 
 
We burn by that echo. It is called love like a wren hunt, 
  crimson ice, basal narcosis. By deep perjury 
        it is the descent of man. Above him 
      the dicots flourish their pattern of indefinite growth, 
   as under cloud now the silent ones “are loath to change 
         their way of life.” The stress lines con- 
  verge in finite resonance: is this the orchestral 
momentum of the seed coat? Our trust selects 
           the ice cap of the General Staff, rod to 
   baton to radon seed (snowy hypomania)—thus he GLOSSATOR 2 
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       jabs a hysteric wound, H2O2 at top strength. 
 
Yet in the tent of holy consternation there are shadows 
      for each column of fire; in the hedgerow the wren 
   flits cross-wise from branch to branch. Afferent  
           signal makes cantilena of speech 
      as from the far round of the child-way. 
  We are bleached in sound as it burns by what 
             we desire; light darting 
    over and over, through a clear sky.
22 
 
“Treatment in the Field” is the opening frame in a form of narrative 
in a multiply-causal, non-intentional universe the closing of frame of 
which will be “Again in the Black Cloud.” “Treatment in the Field” is 
a  poem  which  pivots  upon  multiple  thresholds  and  agencies  and 
urgencies  simultaneously  neurological,  medical,  philosophical  and 
poetic. The preoccupations of Wound Response – and subsequently in 
the developed oeuvre of its author - are fully announced in this poem. 
From the trauma figured in the title “Treatment in the Field” – which 
term,  field,  is  especially  rich  in  English  poetic  language
23  –  to  the 
question of threshold (“the window”) and the related question of the 
position (or place) from which a subject may be a witness to events 
unfolding with it or through it, or even, in spite of it, the subject, that 
is,  as  a  momentary  articulation  of  consciousness  in  a  larger  field, 
where 
   
        in sedate attachment stands the order of battle, 
        quiet as a colour chart and bathed 
       by threads of hyaline and gold leaf. 
  
The window through which the perception (or apperception) of the 
clearing sky is announced begins the collapsing of the distinct orders 
of sensory noemata as the  quiet condition announced through the 
contrastive imagery – “in sedate attachment stands the order of battle” – 
 
22 J.H. Prynne, “Treatment in the Field,” Wound Response, 5 / 216. 
23 On the etymological, metaphorical and theological richness of the word 
field in its Germanic registers, cf. J.H. Prynne, “A Pedantic Note in Two 
Parts, “The English Intelligencer, 2
nd Series, (June 1967), 346-341. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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is deepened, by a local, powerful barbiturate as intravenous anesthetic 
prior to a larger, more general anesthetic: 
 
  The brietal perfusion makes a controlled 
      amazement and trustingly we walk there, speak 
        fluently on the same level of sound; 
 
 
at  which  moment  the  transition  through  another  order  of  sensory 
experience is  made: the level of  sound. Landscape (announced  by 
“the descent of man,” that is, katabasis, as “Above him / the dicots 
flourish their pattern of indefinite growth”) will become expressively 
acoustic – “that guttural landscape” – and simultaneously haptic and 
chromatic: 
 
                  the darker 
       folds of that guttural landscape which 
lie drawn up under our touch 
 
as the synaesthesia encompasses and confounds, confuses all spheres 
(interior/exterior)  as  well  as  modes  (seeing,  hearing)  and  capacity 
(memory): 
 
               Blue-green to yellow 
          in memory beyond the gold number: the 
  tones and sweetness confuse in saline. 
 
In “Treatment in the Field” sound is the medium par excellence of the 
fluidization, purification and cross-matching of ontological categories. 
There is the sound of “a hysteric wound”; the “white murmur” that 
ferries  language  (“the  clauses”)  “to  the  true  /  centre  of  the  sleep 
forum,” that is, to the hypnoid condition which in “Of Movement 
Towards  a  Natural  Place”  will  be  linked  to  the  “white  flakes”  as 
symptom  of  an  underlying  “white  rate”  of  histological  (wound) 
acceleration: 
 
upon his lips curious white flakes, like thin snow. 
He sees his left wrist rise to tell him the time, 
to set damage control at the same white rate.  
(WR 12 / 223.) 
 GLOSSATOR 2 
168 
By the time of the last poem of Wound Response, that is, “Again in the 
Black  Cloud,”  the  white  murmur  of  ferrying  at  the  white  rate  of 
damage control – for, as it is said in “Again in the Black Cloud,” 
“Damage makes perfect”) – will become metonymically presented as 
“the white bees”: 
 
    Falling loose with a grateful hold 
         of the sounds towards purple, the white bees 
swarm out from the open voice gap.  Such “treasure” […]. 
  
From  beginning  to  end  in  Wound  Response,  the  role  of  sound  and 
acoustic imagery (“We burn by that echo”) is presented in relation to 
pharmacology  inducing  a  secondary  state,  for  just  as  “The  brietal 
perfusion”  points  to  a  powerful  but  local  anesthetic,  likewise  does 
basal narcosis point to a narcosis (etymologically a benumbing) induced 
by sedatives in a surgical patient prior to a general anesthetic, or more 
generally, any drug-induced form of unconsciousness: 
 
  We burn by that echo. It is called love like a wren hunt, 
    crimson ice, basal narcosis. 
 
In the condition comparable to the state of basal narcosis the patient is 
not responsive to verbal stimuli – from the position of an observer 
such as a medical professional - but remains responsive to noxious 
stimuli.  The  echo  here  figures  an  acoustic  doubling.  In  such  a 
condition the patient is a riot of cross-matching sensory overload and 
implosion (a  “tent  of holy consternation,”  shot through  with pain, 
that is, “each column of fire,” which is indistinguishably both pain 
and fire) and language as itself an acoustic and material quilt of cross-
matching movements (the wren that “flits cross-wise from branch to 
branch” figuring this sensation of language as affect which also is the 
movement – “branch to branch” - of afferent pathways: “Afferent / 
signal  makes  the  cantilena  of  speech,”  that  is,  a  primal,  ur-song 
communicated  through  “the  far  round  of  the  child-way”)  whose 
enveloping  actions  lead  to  the  neural  state  (a  mark  and  form  of 
temporal and topographical regression) in which, 
 
    We are bleached in sound as it burns by what 
               we desire; light darting 
        over and over, through a clear sky. 
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There  is  here  complete  regulative  indistinction  between  affect  and 
thought, inside and outside as “sound burns by what / we desire.” 
The poem begins “Through the window the sky clears” and closes 
with “light darting / over and over, through a clear sky.” What has 
taken place, or, what has receded in order that the sky – or a saline 
solution become acoustic - should become clear as though the sky is an 
effect, a property of clarity and acoustic projection?
24 Here is the closing 
stanza uninterrupted in all its rich, chromatic, pain-filled synaesthesia:  
 
 Yet in the tent of holy consternation there are shadows 
          for each column of fire; in the hedgerow the wren 
   flits cross-wise from branch to branch. Afferent  
                signal makes cantilena of speech 
           as from the far round of the child-way. 
   We are bleached in sound as it burns by what 
              we desire; light darting 
     over and over, through a clear sky.   
 
The conclusion to “Treatment in the Field” is, as it were, for the non-
subject centered actions to be re-situated, in a powerful rendition of 
passivity, “Again in the Black Cloud.” The poems, then, are acoustic 
pendants. 
 
 
IV 
 
  intention,  ad.  L.  intention-em  stretching,  straining, 
effort,  attention,  application,  design,  purpose,  etc.,  n.  of 
action from intendere to intend. 
 
24  Here  we  might  recall  the  P.F.  Strawson’s  important  reflections  on  the 
metaphysical conditions of auditory spatiality and the problem of satisfying 
the  conditions  of  a  non-solipsistic  consciousness.  Cf.  P.F.  Strawson, 
“Sounds,”  Individuals:  An  Essay  in  Descriptive  Metaphysics  (London:  Methuen, 
1964), 59-86. I have elsewhere used Strawson’s thinking to explore the role of 
blue and the figuring of sound in the dream-work canvasses of the Surrealist 
painter  Joan  Miró,  cf.  Michael  Stone-Richards,  “A  Painting  of  Suspended 
Feeling,” Place and Liminality: Studies in Surrealist Art (forthcoming). GLOSSATOR 2 
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  first intention, the healing of a lesion or fracture by 
the  immediate  re-union  of  the  severed  parts,  without 
granulation; 
  second  intention,  the  healing  of  a  wound  by 
granulation after suppuration. 
  Oxford English Dictionary 
 
Do not think that because I call it a ‘darkness’ or a ‘cloud’ 
it is the sort of cloud you see in the sky […].  
The Cloud of Unknowing
25 
 
AGAIN IN THE BLACK CLOUD 
 
        Shouts rise again from the water 
surface and flecks of cloud skim over 
        to storm-light, going up the stem. 
        Falling loose with a grateful hold 
        of the sounds towards purple, the white bees 
swarm out from the open voice gap.  Such “treasure”: 
        the cells of the child line run back 
       through hope to the cause of it; the hour 
is crazed by fracture. Who can see what he loves, 
       again or before, as the injury shears 
        past the curve of recall, the field 
       double-valued at the divine point. 
 
                   Air to blood 
           are the two signs, flushed with the sound: 
          (a) “tended to refrain from aimless wandering” 
          (b) “experienced less dizziness” 
          (c) “learned to smile a little” 
          (d) “said they felt better and some indeed 
                seemed happier” —out in the 
               snow-fields the aimless beasts 
mean what they do, so completely the shout 
        is dichroic in gratitude, 
       half-silvered, the 
 
25  The  Cloud  of  Uknowing  and  other  Works,  trans.  Clifton  Wolters 
(Harmondsworth, 1961, 1978), 66. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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        gain control set for “rescue” at 
          negative echo line. The clouds now “no longer 
giving light but full of it,” the entry condition a daze 
        tending to mark zero.  Shouting and 
laughing and intense felicity given over, rises 
       under the hill as tinnitus aurium, hears the 
        child her blue 
        coat! his new 
             shoes and boat! 
       Round and round there is descent through 
the leader stroke, flashes of light over slopes, fear 
         grips the optic muscle. Damage makes perfect: 
“reduced cerebral blood flow and oxygen utilisation 
are manifested by an increase in slow frequency waves, 
a decrease in alpha-wave activity, an increase in 
beta-waves, the appearance of paroxysmal potentials.” 
 
            And constantly the 
         child line dips into sleep, the 
more than countably infinite hierarchy of 
        higher degree causality conditions 
setting the reverse signs of memory and dream. 
       “Totally confused most of the time” —is 
        the spending of gain 
         or damage mended 
         and ended, aged, the 
         shouts in the rain:  in 
         to the way out 
 
Run at 45 to the light cones, this cross- 
   matching of impaired attention 
feels wet streaking down the tree bark, 
  a pure joy at a feeble joke.
26 
 
  The poem opens upon an expansive field of sound: 
 
    Shouts rise again from the water  
surface 
 
26 J.H. Prynne, “Again in the Black Cloud,” Wound Response, 20-21 / 230-231. GLOSSATOR 2 
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in such a way that the problematic of cross-matching modalities  – 
synaesthesia  –  is  immediately  announced  in  a  manner  at  once 
phenomenological,  prosodic  and  expressive  as  pivoting  upon  the 
semantic and tonic possibilities effected by the opening line break at 
“water  /  surface”  readily  permitting  of:  “the  water  surface” 
(substantive),  “surface  (verb)  and  flecks  of  cloud…,”  underlying 
which is a direction of rhythm taking up all possibilities in its wake.  
Here  we  have  the  problematic  at  the  outset:    transformation  and 
process, that is, the problematic of agency, change and movement.  
What surface?  What is the status of surface and shouts?  If surface may 
at first be construed as a noun it points not to a place but an expanse; 
but  when,  through  the  line  break,  it  is  construable  as  a  verb,  the 
sudden dynamism thereby glimpsed makes of the expanse, in relation 
to  the  stanzaic  shaping,  a  dynamism  of  twisting,  helix  motion, 
transforming  the  expanse  into  a  momentary  membrane.  We  may, 
though,  locate  the  concern  with  transformation  and  process  more 
precisely as relative to measurement and measure by the presence of 
‘flecks of cloud’ and the black cloud of the title: 
 
        Shouts rise again from the water 
surface and flecks of cloud skim over 
       to storm-light, going up the stem 
 
where the bare incidence of point of contact figured by flecks and the 
moment of surface suggests both speed, transience and evanescence in 
place and dimension. As so often with such poetry the abundance of 
iconographic  and  typological  possibilities  is  the  source  of  richness, 
ambiguity and a threatened semantic inertia, even as there is a certain 
swiftness, or lightness in the rhythm and directedness of the poem’s 
reading  voice.  Consider,  for  example,  that  measure,  as  humanly 
significant distance and proximity, is often conveyed through cloud 
imagery as conveyed in many a passage from the Hebrew Bible (in 
the diction of the King James Bible), especially the Psalms, where, for 
example, in Psalm XXXVI, we find it said that “Thy mercy, O Lord, 
is in the heavens; and thy faithfulness reacheth unto the clouds” (Ps 
XXXVI, v. 5), where, too, the prevailing sense is not only of the 
reach of God’s benevolence  and bounty (the God “Who covereth 
the  heaven  with  clouds,  who  prepareth  rain  for  the  earth,  who 
maketh grass to grow upon the mountains,” Ps CXXXXVII, v. 8) Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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but  His  being  beyond  human  measure  at  the  same  time  that  His 
measureless sense of measure returns to humans their just deserts, that 
is, judgment, whence Job:  
 
  Behold, God is great, and we know him not, neither 
can the number of his years be searched out. 
  For he maketh small the drops of water: they pour 
down rain according to the vapour thereof: 
  Which  the  clouds  do  drop  and  distil  upon  man 
abundantly. 
  Also can any understand the spreadings of the clouds 
or the noise of his tabernacle? 
  Behold, he spreadeth his light upon it, and covereth 
the bottom of the sea. 
  For by them judgeth he the people; he giveth meat in 
abundance. 
  With clouds he covereth the light; and commandeth it 
not to shine by the cloud that cometh betwixt. 
  (The Book of Job, chapter 36, vv. 26-32) 
 
This  language  of  measure,  abundance  and  judgment  is  not 
archaicism, as it is still operative in the poetic thought of Hölderlin 
and, not unrelated, the English Romantics such as Wordsworth and 
Shelley,  where  it  is  either  the  sense  of  abundance,  of  gift  (the 
unforeseen, the undeserved, the unasked for), that is operative, or the 
sense  of  the  aleatoric  movement  of  the  cloud  as  figure  of  the 
movement of thought, but never the sense of judgment. Always, the 
deployment  of  cloud  imagery  –  and  we  shall  speak  here  of  cloud 
imagery  as  though  the  conception  of  clouds  is  at  least  relatively 
stable
27  -  is intimately related to the issue of humanly significant 
measure even when it is the unboundedness of God or the cosmos 
that is at issue. So, in the famous reflect ions of John Ruskin, for 
example, titled “Of Cloud Beauty” from his Modern Painters, we find 
in the opening that “Between earth and man arose the leaf. Between 
the  heaven  and  man  came  the  cloud.  His  life  being  partly  as  the 
 
27 Cf. Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New 
York:  Schocken,  1969),  133;  and  cf.  Ulrich  Baer,  “The  Experience  of 
Freedom,” Remnants of Song: Trauma and the Experience of Modernity in Charles 
Baudelaire and Paul Celan (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 2000), 52. GLOSSATOR 2 
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falling leaf, and partly as the  flying vapor,” before asking, simply: 
“Has the reader any distinct idea of what clouds are?”
28 In one sense 
Ruskin simply re-phrases the old idea of man as mid-way between the 
beasts  and  angels,  but  in  another  sense,  as  witnessed  by  his 
extraordinary  descriptive  phenomenology  of  cloud  formations,  he 
was more concerned with man’s placement within the modern (that 
is, industrial) condition even as, in his chapter on “The Angel of the 
Sea,” he would quote Job (following the Vulgate) and return to the 
configuration between cloud and judgment: 
 
  For these are the robes of love of the Angel of the Sea. 
To these that name is chiefly given, the “spreadings of the 
clouds,” from their extent, their gentleness, their fullness of 
rain. Note how they are spoken of in Job  xxxvi. V. 29-
31.“By  them  judgeth  he  the  people;  he  giveth  meat  in 
abundance.  With  clouds  he  covereth  the  light.  He  hath 
hidden  the  light  in  his  hands,  and  commanded  that  it 
should return. He speaks of it to his friend; that it is his 
possession, and that he may ascend thereto. 
  That,  then,  is  the  Sea  Angel’s  message  to  God’s 
friends; that, the meaning of those strange golden lights and 
purple flashes before the morning rain. The rain is sent to 
judge, and feed us; but the light is the possession of the 
friends of God, and they may ascend thereto […].
29 
 
Judgment is not the primary term, but measure, and after Ruskin’s 
extraordinary reflections on the formation and symbolism of clouds, 
it  will  no  longer  be  possible  to  present  the  explicit  relationship 
between cloud and judgment, but judgment – our just deserts – will 
not be evacuated, rather it will be made subject to a new poetics of 
dissemblance  and  complex  mirroring  in  relation  to  threshold 
experiences, of ten mediated acoustically.  
  Of the poets important in the formation of Prynne’s poetics and 
sensibility, from Wordsworth to Stevens, the imagery and language 
of  clouds  is  part  of  the  reflexes  in  the  established  manner  of 
presentation. In order to present our concerns on dissemblance and 
 
28 John Ruskin, “Of Cloud Beauty,” Modern Painters, Book V (Boston: Aldine 
Book Publishing Co., c. 1886), 140. 
29 John Ruskin, “The Angel of the Sea,” Modern Painters, Book V, 183.  Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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mirroring,  there  are  two  poets,  Charles  Baudelaire  and  Georg 
Trakl,
30  whose rendition of a thinking of cloud imagery will be 
determinant for the poetic thought of Prynne. For Trakl, the cloud is 
an  image  –  and  medium  –  of  transformation  of  aisthesis  and 
consciousness:  it  affects  what  it  covers,  transforms  it,
31  but there is 
rarely ever question that the cloud is anything but an image of 
interior movement: its stillness, its silences, its ability to freeze or 
capture light (“Winterd￤mmerung”
32), to be a mark of the freezing or 
slowing of time, to be a mark of darkness or shadow (“Abendlied”
33), 
the abstractive absorption of color, in a landscape stripped, denuded 
of all but the forms of affects become autonomous powers in a late 
Symbolist  theatre  of  the  interior  voice.
34  The cloud can be purple 
(purpurner Wolke), or golden, or red, just as the sun can be purple, or 
dreams can be purple; the cloud can be aglow with light and time 
(“Musik  im  Mirabel”
35)  or  broken,  transpierced  by  light 
(“Menscheit”
36), or the accompaniment on a walk, that is, figure for 
the  movement  of  thought  in  a  mirrored  medium  (“Die  Wolke 
wandert übern Weiherspiegel / The cloud wanders over the mirror 
surface of a fishpond”
37). The diction of Trakl will be determinant in 
local  gestures  in  certain  of  Prynne’s  work  from  The  White  Stones 
(“Finely, brush the/ sound from your / eyes”
38) to concentrated form 
in such work as Into the Day and The Oval Window, where, for example, 
the following landscape scene is made possible by, and in dialogue – 
and walking – with, the language of Trakl: 
 
30 On the aesthetics of mirroring in Trakl, cf. Eric B. Williams, The Mirror and 
the Word: Modernism, Literary Theory, and Georg Trakl (Lincoln and London: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1993). 
31 Cf. Francis Michael Sharp, “Poetic Figures of Altered Consciousness,” The 
Poet’s  Madness:  A  Reading  of  Georg  Trakl  (Ithaca:  Cornell  University  Press, 
1981), 110-136. 
32 Georg Trakl, “Winterd￤mmerung,” Dichtungen und Briefe, volume 1, eds., 
Walther Killy and Hans Szklenar (Salzburg: Otto Muller, 1969), 20. 
33 Georg Trakl, “Abendlied,” Dichtungen und Briefe, vol. 1, 65. 
34  Cf.  Jeremy  Prynne,  “‘Modernism’  in  German  Poetry,”  The  Cambridge 
Review, (March 1963), 331-337. 
35 Georg Trakl, “Musik im Mirabel,” Dichtungen und Briefe, volume 1, 18. 
36 Georg Trakl, “Menscheit,” Dichtungen und Briefe, volume 1, 43. 
37 Georg Trakl, “Der Herbst des Einsamen,” Dichtungen und Briefe, vol. 1, 109. 
38 J.H. Prynne, “On the Anvil,” The White Stones, 15 / 42. This poem could be 
compared  with  the  use  of  sounds  in  the  lunar  eyes  in  Trakl’s  “An  den 
Knaben Elis,” Dichtungen und Briefe, vol. 1, 26. GLOSSATOR 2 
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The clouds are white in a pale autumn sky. 
Looking at the misty paths I see this stooping 
figure seeming to falter, in a thick compound 
of adjustments, sublimed in white flakes. Then 
it clears down, she turns or round her 
the sweet breath goes about, at midnight 
murmuring. Extremities flexed and cold. 
A light wind crosses the fragrant waters; 
deaf to reason I cup my hands, to  
dew-drenched apricot flowers and their 
livid tranquility. It has the merit 
of being seen to hurt, in her dream, 
and then much further on, it does. 
The Oval window, 29 / 334 
 
Likewise the moments of delicate dream diction in The Oval Window 
evoke that of Trakl: 
 
the stars are snowing, do you see it there: 
bright moonlight whitens the pear blossom. 
You listen by the oval window, as 
calm waves flow onward to the horizon. 
  The Oval Window, 25 / 330 
 
Of especial import is the manner in which in Trakl, for example, in a 
poem  such  as  “An  den  Knaben  Elis,”  there  is  characteristically  a 
moment  or  incident  which  signals  a  passage  or  transition  in  the 
nature, kind and dimension of experience at hand: 
 
Elis, wenn die Amsel im schwarzen Wald ruft, 
Dieses ist dein Untergang. 
 
[…] 
 
Laß, wenn deine Stirne leise blutet 
Uralte Legenden 
Und dunkle Deutung des Vogelflugs. 
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Die voll purpurner Trauben hangt, 
Und du regst die Arme schöner im Blau. 
 
(Elis, when the blackbird in the black forest calls 
This is your descent. […]  
 
Endure,
39 when your forehead quietly bleeds  
Ancient legends 
And the dark meaning of bird-flight. 
 
But you, with soft steps walk into the night 
Laden with purple grapes 
And more beautiful is the movement of your arm in the  
    blue.)
40 
 
One can hear in these passages from Trakl the blood which “fails the 
ear, trips the bird’s / fear of bright blue” which opens Into the Day, and 
which,  too,  abruptly  marks  the  moment  of  transformation  to 
experience  as  passage  and  transition;  likewise  can  one  read  the 
wound – that is, the dark augur - on the forehead at contre-coup in 
“Of  Movement  Towards  a  Natural  Place,”  where  “the  /  bruise  is 
glossed by ‘nothing much’ but drains to deep excitement.” (WR 12 / 
223.) 
  Arguably  the  most  dramatic,  enigmatic  -  and  modern  - 
performance of this thinking of the iconology of clouds is Baudelaire’s 
“L’Étranger”  (The  Stranger),  the  opening  prose-poem  to  the  Petits 
poëmes en prose (Le Spleen de Paris), posthumously published in 1869. 
 
  L’Étranger 
 
-  Qui aimes-tu le mieux, homme énigmatique, dis? ton père, ta 
  mère, ta soeur ou ton frère? 
-   Je n’ai pas ni père, ni mère, ni soeur, ni frère. 
-  Tes amis? 
-  Vous  vous  servez  là  d’une  parole  dont  le  sens  m’est  resté 
  jusqu’à ce jour inconnue. 
 
39 This rendering of laß as endure is adopted from Francis Michael Sharp’s 
reading in The Poet’s Madness, 114-117. 
40 Georg Trakl, “An den Knaben Elis,” Dichtungen und Briefe, vol. 1, 26. GLOSSATOR 2 
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-  Ta patrie? 
-  J’ignore sous quelle latitude elle est située. 
-  La beauté? 
-  Je l’aimerais volontiers, déesse et immortelle. 
-  L’or? 
-  Je le haïs comme vous haïssez Dieu. 
-  Eh! qu’aimes-tu donc, extrordinaire étranger? 
-  J’aime  les  nuages…  les  nuages  qui  passent…  là-bas…  là-
  bas… les merveilleux nuages!
41 
 
 
-  Whom  best  do  you  love,  enigmatic  man,  say?  your  father, 
  your mother, your sister or your brother? 
-   I have neither father, nor mother, nor sister, nor brother. 
-  Your friends? 
-  There you avail yourself of a word the sense of which to this 
  very day escapes me. 
-  Your country? 
-  I am unaware of the latitude under which it is situated. 
-  Beauty? 
-  I would willingly love it, goddess and immortal. 
-  Gold? 
-  I hate it as you hate God. 
-  Well! what, then, do you love, extraordinary stranger? 
-  I love the clouds … the clouds which pass … over there … 
  over there … the marvelous clouds! 
 
It is not my wish here to develop an exegesis of this radically simple 
poetic  work,  but,  rather,  to  present  it  as  part  of  the  poetic 
configuration  actively  at  work  in  the  formation  of  the  distinctive 
deployment  of  cloud  thought  in  Wound  Response  and  the  oeuvre  of 
Prynne,  and  so  I  shall  be  direct.  The  first  matter  announced  in 
“L’Étranger,” and developed throughout Petits poëmes en prose, is that of 
 
 
41 Charles Baudelaire, “L’Étranger,” Petits poëmes en prose (Le Spleen de Paris), 
ed., Robert Kopp (Paris: Gallimard, 1973), 23. All subsequent citations from 
this work will be in text as PPP followed by page number. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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love: what is it? How is it constituted, which is, by what relations 
bounded, connected or sustained? The second matter announced in 
this prose poem and treated of throughout the collection – especially 
in relation to the problem of time and boredom, one sense of the 
originally English word spleen - is that of resemblance, or rather, lack 
of resemblance: for example in “Le miroir” (PPP 121) where a man 
looking at himself in a mirror is questioned as to why he bothers, and 
where, too, it is not at all obvious from where the question is posed, 
from outside or from within an imagined speech of self-affection; in 
“L’Invitation au voyage” (PPP 61-64) the problem of resemblance is 
explicitly raised in the identification between self and place (“There is 
a region [contrée] which resembles you,” PPP 61), self and property 
(“this canvas which resembles you,” PPP 63, “These treasures, these 
furnishings [etc.], they’re you,” PPP 63), self and thought (“those are 
my  thoughts  which  sleep  or  roll  on  your  breast.  Gently  you  lead 
them towards the sea which is infinity, all the while reflecting the depths 
of the sky in the limpidity of your beautiful soul,”  PPP 63-64, my 
emphases);  the  problem  of  the  temporality  of  boredom,  for 
Baudelaire the affection most destructive of (psychic) relations and 
hence stable resemblance, is most dramatically treated – and rendered 
– through the murderousness of a Prince who feared nothing … save 
l’ennui in “Une mort héroique” (PPP 89-94). That the temporality of 
boredom is of especial moment to Baudelaire is clear from the opening 
poem “Au lecteur” in Les Fleurs du Mal which speaks of all the vices 
and  corruption  of  man  but  of  which  there  is  one,  just  one,  more 
feared by “Vous, hypocrite lecteur, mon semblable, mon frère,” than 
any  other,  namely,  boredom,  which  verse,  of  course,  is  the 
concluding verse of “The Burial of the Dead,” the opening division of 
Eliot’s The Waste Land. If, for Baudelaire, boredom is that which most 
dangerously  and  effectively  attacks  the  energy  of  connectivity,  the 
logic of relations, then the  clouds (les nuages qui passent…), in their 
ease,  their  effortlessness  –  can  boredom  be  considered  a  form  of 
energy? -  become the emblematic double, the enigmatic sign of the 
disaggregation of relations at every ontological level of categoriality, 
and  thereby  the  undoing  of  measure  as  opening  onto  the  purely 
enigmatic,  whence  the  radical  simplicity  of  “L’Étranger.”  It  is  the 
attack  upon  the  energies  of  connectivity  and  relations  which 
established the radicality of the prose poems of Baudelaire – a key 
model  for  Trakl  –  and  their  modernity,  in  making  for  a  style  of 
reading, or rather, style of attention, no longer merely thematic but 
figural, which works to defeat interpretation as content, but which GLOSSATOR 2 
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necessitates the invitation to interpretation from the outset. It matters 
little whether the undoing of relations be that of the psychological or, 
even, the cosmological, whence, in Prynne’s elegy to Paul Celan, “Es 
Lebe  Der  König,”  this  notion  of  measure  is  conveyed  through  its 
cognate relation measurement: 
 
Fire and honey oozes from cracks in the earth; 
the cloud eases up the Richter scale
42 
 
where the implied undoing of measure in the disaster at the planetary 
level avails itself of Celan’s version of the purely enigmatic,  
 
Ihre – “ein 
Rätsel ist Rein- 
entsprungenes” –, ihre 
Erinnerung an 
schwimmende Hölderlinturme, mowent- 
umschwirrt.
43 
 
Their – “an enigma is 
the purely 
originated” –, their 
memory of 
Hölderlin towers afloat, circled 
by whirring gulls
44  
 
which  itself  avails  itself  of  the  energies  released  in  Hölderlin’s 
rendition of the undoing of measure, when to the question, posed by 
“In lieblicher Blaue…”: “Giebt es auf Erden ein Mass?” the answer 
comes  simply,  “Es  giebt  keines.  Nemlich  est  hemmen  den 
Donnergang nie die Welten des Schopfers.”
45 (Is there a measure on 
earth? There is none. For never the Creator’s worlds constrict the 
 
42 J.H. Prynne, “Es Lebe der König,” Brass (London: Ferry Press, 1971), 31 / 
Poems, 169. 
43 Paul Celan, “Tübingen, J￤nner,” Die Niemandrose (1963) in Gedichte, vol. I 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1981), 226. 
44  Pau1  Celan,  “Tübingen,  January,”  Poems,  trans.  Michael  Hamburger 
(Manchester: Carcanet Press, 1980), 145. 
45 Friedrich Hölderlin, “In lieblicher Bl￤ue…,” Samtliche Werke, vol. 2: Gedichte 
Nach 1800, ed., Friedrich Beissner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953), 372. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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progress of thunder.) Characteristic of the thought at work in this 
poetics is the unworking of image, relation and measure: where “Es 
Lebe der König” says that the 
 
                      Sky divides 
as the flag once more become technical, the print 
divides also; starlight becomes negative,
46 
 
“In lieblicher Bl￤ue…” posits the scene of a man looking into a mirror 
seeing  his  picture  (Bild)  “es  gleicht  dem  Manne”  (it  resembles  the 
man), which image / picture will then be compared to Oedipus and 
his  “indescribable,  unspeakable,  inexpressible”  sufferings  making 
thereby  the  self-likeness  self-torn  whilst  remaining  in  place,  like  a 
mask.
47 
  To this particular form of legibility of cloud iconography and 
thought we are also given a form of experience through colour:
48 
 
         Falling loose with a grateful hold 
    of the sounds toward purple, the white bees 
swarm out of the open voice gap.  Such “treasure”; 
   
and later, 
         dichroic in gratitude, 
           half-silvered 
[...] 
          The clouds now “no longer 
giving light but full of it.” 
 
The  complex  temporality  inaugurated  by  the  line  break  water  / 
surface  becomes definitively anachronised as  time is  maddened by 
fractures  (“the  hour  /  is  crazed  by  fracture”)  and  so  self-divisive, 
whilst the question of love is articulated explicitly for the first time in 
relation to vision, painful affection and possibly irreversible loss (of 
memory, identity, of continuation represented by “the child line”) in a 
 
46 J.H. Prynne, “Es Lebe der König,” Brass, 31 / Poems, 169. 
47 Friedrich Hölderlin, “In lieblicher Bl￤ue ... ,” Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2, ed., 
Friedrich Beissner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1953), 372. 
48 Cf. Ruskin who writes that “colour is the type of love,” Modern Painters, 
volume V, 403. GLOSSATOR 2 
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field  of  highly  delimited  but  differing  forces  (“the  field  /  double-
valued”): 
   
         Falling loose with a grateful hold 
         of the sounds towards purple, the white bees 
swarm out from the open voice gap.  Such “treasure”: 
         the cells of the child line run back 
         through hope to the cause of it; the hour 
is crazed by fracture.  Who can see what he loves, 
          again or before, as the injury shears 
         past the curve of recall, the field 
          double-valued at the divine point. 
 
The  field  that  actualizes  the  range  of  painful  affection  is  double-
valued  in  all  instances:  color-clouds,  sound-color,  duration-
discontinuity,  hope-loss,  black  cloud-full  of  light,  etc.  The 
distinctiveness of the role and thinking of color in Wound Response and 
“Again in the Black Cloud” derives in large part from the way that 
color, as part of the problem of cross-matching modalities, is worked 
to  mark  liminal  experience  as  the  means  of  accession  to  and 
manifestation of an autonomous structuring activity. The use of color 
predicates has a long literary history (cf. Revelations) and is especially 
characteristic  of  the  representation  of  intensity  of  expression  in 
Romantic poetry (witness Coleridge’s “Christmas out of Doors”) but 
only  becomes  of  literary  value  when  it  becomes  part  of  /  or  pays 
attention to the verbal fabric of the given work. Thus consider aspects 
of Coleridge’s “Christmas out of Doors” and its conviction 
 
that there are sounds more sublime than any sight can be, 
more absolutely suspending the power of comparison, and more 
utterly absorbing the mind’s self-consciousness in its total 
attention to the object working upon it,
49 
 
or the following passage from Büchner’s Lenz to which we shall return 
below:  
 
 
49 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, “Christmas out of Doors,” The Friend: A Series of 
Essays, vol. II (London: Rest Fenner, 1818), 323-324. My emphasis. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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Only  once  or  twice,  when  the  storm  forced  the  clouds 
down into the valleys and the mist rose from below, and 
voices  echoed  from  the  rocks,  sometimes  like  distant 
thunder,  sometimes  in  a  mighty  rush  like  wild  songs  in 
celebration of the earth; or when the clouds reared up like 
wildly whinnying horses and the sun’s rays shone through, 
drawing their glittering sword across the snowy slopes, so 
that a blinding light sliced downward from the peak to the 
valley; or when the stormwind blew the clouds down and 
away,  tearing into them a pale blue lake of sky, until the 
wind abated and a humming sound like a lullaby or the 
ringing of bells floated upwards from the gorges far below, 
and from the tops of the fir trees, and a gentle red crept 
across  the  blue,  and  tiny  clouds  drifted  pass  on  silver 
wings,  and  all  the  peaks  shone  and  glistened  sharp  and 
clear  across  the  landscape;  at  such  moments  he  felt  a 
tugging  in  his  breast  and  stood  panting,  his  body  leant 
forward, eyes and mouth torn open; he felt as though he 
would have to suck up the storm and receive it within him. 
He would stretch himself flat on the ground, communing 
with nature with a joyfulness that caused pain
50  
 
and it is clear, not only that we are dealing in part with a comparable 
imagery  in  “Again  in  the  Black  Cloud”  emblematic  of  intense 
experience at a subliminal level, but that the symbolism points to and 
registers  an  autonomously  structured  activity  the  form  of  which  is 
metonymically conveyed by “storm-light, going up in the stem” (WR 
20 / 230), or “light darting / over and over, through a clear sky” (WR 
5 / 216).  This, though important, is not sufficient to do the work 
which is necessary to secure what is distinctive to the procedures of 
this  poem  as  articulating  an  autonomous  structuration,  for  the 
domain  of  experience  circumscribed  by  such  color  predicates  is 
nothing as simple as an “overwhelming poetic experience”- thought 
that  is  assuredly  at  play  –  but,  in  a  manner  characteristic  of  this 
poetry and poetics, something both more precise yet larger in scope, 
namely, the representation of the experience of electrical charges across 
 
50 Georg Büchner, Lenz (A Novella), (1835), trans. by Michael Patterson in 
Georg Büchner, The Complete Plays (London: Methuen, 1987), 249-250. My 
emphasis. GLOSSATOR 2 
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the  synapses  during  an  experience  of  regression  consequent  upon 
extreme,  intense,  damage;  a  physical  damage  local  yet  systemic  in 
implication [in analogy with language]: may be a heart attack from 
the  subjective  experience  of  a  heart  attack  (what  would  be 
characterized by neurology as the movement of a rigid temporality), 
and/or may be an epileptic fit (the movement of a free temporality, 
that  is,  of  the  brain  or  consciousness)  at  the  precise  point  –  place 
defined as the dimension which permits the imbrication of differing 
temporalities in the same function
51 – where the electrical charting of 
the  body  does  not  readily  permit  a  distinguishing  of  one  set  of 
symptomologies  from  another  -  thus  the  literary  language  of  sub-
liminal experience becomes a condition of legibility through which (as 
it were) another language, another articulated expressivity, manifests itself: 
the  moving  forms  of  threshold  /  liminal  experience  as  modified, 
adapted to scientific discourse, a discourse in which both the status of 
objectness  is  at  issue  no  less  than  the  language  and  position  of 
observation and actions of autonomous structuration. 
  The action of the poem, the mode of embodying autonomous 
structurations,  its  deployment  of  multiple  expressive  and  technical 
languages and forms for action, can be appreciated in a number of 
ways at once poetic and technical. Consider, for example, the action 
and significance of what I shall characterize as stanzaic shaping, that 
is, the shape of the patterns of stanzas on the page and the question of 
whether and how they might be read aloud. Prynne has long been on 
record – in teaching and more recently in publication
52 – as skeptical 
of the desirability of reading poetry aloud, and this from one with an 
exceptional ear and sensitivity to quantitative syllabic articulation in 
his diction. There are certain poems which it is difficult to know how 
to  read  aloud  (Mallarmé’s  Un  coup  de  dés),  or  which  may  not  be 
intended to be heard aloud (Pound’s “The Return”), like a soliloquy 
where the stage convention requires that the actor speaks in order for 
the interior thoughts of the character to be heard by the audience. 
This convention, though, is but a fiction of which lyric poetry has no 
need, and so the epistemology of lyric attention can legitimately pose 
the question of whether certain poems or types of poems ought – or 
can,  indeed  –  be  meaningfully  read  aloud,  a  form  of  thinking  that 
 
51 Cf. Jacques Nassif, Freud, l’inconscient (Paris: Galilée, 1977), 128. 
52 Cf. J.H. Prynne, “Mental Ears and Poetic Work,” Chicago Review, vol. 55, 
no.1 (Winter 2010), 126-157.    Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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cannot but have ontological implications about what a poem is and 
the experience of what is constituted through the compact of reader 
and  poem.  This  problem  of  the  ontology  of  readerly  acoustics  is 
presented from the opening line break of water / surface in “Again in 
the Black Cloud”  
 
      Shouts rise again from the water 
surface and flecks of cloud skim over 
      to storm-light, going up the stem 
 
as any articulate and musically sensitive reader would try to embody 
and convey the phonic difference between substantive and verb for 
water and both simultaneously, or try to capture as vocal inflections, 
marks of pitch or timbre, the slight and varying indentations of each 
verse  line.  This  would  suggest,  too,  that  the  visual  scansion,  the 
typographic disposition of the poem on the page, is meaningful in 
terms  of  the  possible  rendition  of  the  voice,  as  though  the  visual 
scansion is a form of primitive score for the reader. (That few poets 
themselves enact the implied visual scansion of their own poems is 
another piece of evidence that may be further adduced in the Prynne 
argument against the reading aloud of certain kinds of poetry. A case 
in point, just to stay with the readily accessible, would be William 
Carlos Williams’ own performance of “The Descent.”
53) The stanzaic 
 
53 Cf. William Carlos Williams Reading, Caedmon Records, TC 1047, 1954. In 
his lecture courses in the University of Cambridge, for example, the lecture 
series Poetry and Language, Prynne suggests aids to the training of the attentive 
ear, one example of which is that one should be able to listen to the reading 
of a poem and be able to re-construct its layout on the page. This important 
discipline,  however,  not  only  depends  upon  the  listener’s  familiarity  with 
prosodic conventions, it depends even more upon the skill of the reader of 
the poem, and a willingness by the reader to accept that the poem on the 
page is a form of score. The prevalent manner of reading poetry then – the 
flat, uninflected manner, the polar opposite of, say, a Yeats or a Valéry or an 
Akhmatova  -  does  not  allow  the  auditor  to  hear  the  poem  as  an  act  the 
notation for which is inferable back to the page. In such cases, the poem is 
written to be read on the page, but without an explicit acknowledgment of 
this  fact  and  its  implications.  The  dullness  and  sameness  of  most  poetry 
readings  attests  to  this  fact.  In  this  vein  of  argumentation,  then,  poetry 
readings are not about poetry, do not indeed function for poetry but as social 
gatherings, and it is this which is eschewed in Prynne’s reluctance to read in 
public. The reader should be left to her freedom with the poem itself. GLOSSATOR 2 
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shaping of the poems in Wound Response, and a fortiori “Again in the 
Black Cloud,” is not, however, arbitrary. Compare the typographic 
disposition  of  “Again  in  the  Black  Cloud”  to  that  found  in  “Of 
Movement Towards a Natural Place”: 
 
  OF MOVEMENT TOWARDS A NATURAL PLACE 
 
  See him recall the day by moral trace, a squint 
  to cross-fire shewing fear of hurt at top left; the 
  bruise is glossed by “nothing much” but drains 
  to deep excitement. His recall is false but the charge 
  is still there in neural space, pearly blue with a  
  touch of crimson. “By this I mean a distribution 
  of neurons…some topologically preserved transform”, 
  upon his lips curious white flakes, like thin snow. 
  He sees his left wrist rise to tell him the time, 
  to set the damage control at the same white rate. 
 
  What mean square error.
54 Remorse is a pathology of 
  syntax, the expanded time-display depletes the  
  input of “blame” which patters like scar tissue. 
  First intentions are cleanest: no paint on the nail 
  cancels the flux link. Then the sun comes out 
  (top right) and local numbness starts to spread, still 
  he is “excited” because in part shadow. Not will 
  but chance
55 the plants claim but tremble, “a 
  detecting mechanism must integrate across that 
  population”; it makes sense right at the contre-coup. 
 
54 “What mean square error.” Rarely can a term of art from the field of 
statistical  research  have  been  made  to  seem  so  longingly  beautiful.  In 
statistical and medical research there is a practice called the chi squared test. 
Whenever an experiment is conducted on a sample (or population) there is 
an expected resulted (a) followed by the actual experimental result (b), the 
mean  square  error  is  the  attempt  to  quantify  the  difference  between 
expectation and result for which the formula is:  (a-b)². 
55  “Not  will  /  but  chance,”  that  is,  the  problem  of  determinism  which 
randomness  at  the  quantum  level  does  not  resolve,  so  “Of  Movement 
Towards  a  Natural  Place”  explores  the  determinism  of  an  event  and  the 
freedom to follow the event as a second-order activity in a temporality barely 
coincident with the event, freedom, that is, as the ability to understand. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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  So the trace was moral on both sides, as formerly 
  the moment of godly suffusion: anima tota in singulis 
  membris sui corporis.
56 The warmth of cognition not 
 
56 This passage is from St. Anselm of Canterbury’s (1033-1109) Proslogion, or, 
Discourse on the Existence of God (chapter XIII, “How He alone is limitless and 
eternal, although other spirits are also limitless and eternal”). It may be given 
as: “all the soul in each part / or member of his body.” In chapter XIII of the 
Proslogion, Anselm’s (ontological) argument for the existence of God draws 
upon the nature of place in order to distinguish bodies, God and created 
spirits: “Certainly that is absolutely limited which, when it is wholly in one 
place, cannot at the same time be somewhere else. This is seen in the case of 
bodies alone. But that is unlimited which is wholly everywhere at once; this is 
true only of You alone. That, however, is limited and unlimited at the same 
time  which,  while  wholly  in  one  place,  can  at  the  same  time  be  wholly 
somewhere  else  but  not  everywhere;  and  this  is  true  of  created  spirits.” 
Anselm, Proslogion, chapter XIII, in Brian Davis and G.R. Evans, eds., Anselm 
of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 95. It is as though the 
poem  “Of  Movement  Towards  a  Natural  Place”  says,  in  an  ironic,  witty 
manner, in the manner of metaphysical wit: So, here is how the human being 
reaches to the Godly condition, namely, that through pain (which makes the 
human  being  limited,  rooted,  perhaps,  by  the  gravity  of  pain)  it  can  be 
thrown affectively, neurologically and ontologically “somewhere else [if not] 
everywhere.” This is Da-Sein! Then comes the sentence from which the poem 
derives its Latin quotation: “For if the soul were not wholly in each of the 
parts of the body it would not sense wholly in each of them.” Anselm of 
Canterbury, ibid. The wound response is a function of the non-materiality of 
embodiment. 
  St. Anselm is also important as a realist in the debates over nominalism 
and realism. This is the subject for further research especially in the light of 
the attempt to conflate the doctrine of the arbitrariness of the sign (which 
Prynne’s  critical  writings,  following  Benveniste  and  Jakobsen,  expressly 
refute) with nominalism, an epistemological position about universals and the 
ontology of properties and quantification over relations. (The most modern 
version of this medieval debate would be the dialogue between the objectual 
interpretation of quantification in the work of the late Quine (that existence 
can only be predicated of objects and that the status of existence cannot be 
deferred), and the substitutional interpretation of quantification in the work 
of Ruth Barcan Marcus (that quantification can be over relations, that claims 
about the status of existence can indeed be deferred). The tendency is to 
regard Prynne as a nominalist because of the power his poetics accord to 
language, but the same poetics accepts the independent existence of world 
and  cosmos  and  affect  (and  nominalism  is  notoriously  inadequate  in 
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  yet neuroleptic but starry and granular. The more 
  you recall what you call the need for it, she tells 
  him by a shout down the staircase. You call it 
  your lost benevolence (little room for charity), 
  and he rises like a plaque to the sun. Up there the 
  blood levels of the counter-self come into beat 
  by immune reflection, by night lines above the cut: 
 
  Only at the rim does the day tremble and shine.
57 
 
 
In this poem there are three clearly demarcated stanzas, each of ten 
lines, each beginning at the left hand of the margin, with a fin al verse 
line off-set in the isolation of the page. It could not be more visually 
different than “Again in the Black Cloud”: tight, one might even say, 
disciplined; controlled, compact; indeed, there is a directedness to the 
movement, calm and inevitable, which, it can be argued, is a direct 
function of the stanzaic shape as form – the verticality of the poem, its 
top  to  bottom  movement  –  the  function  of  which  is  in  part  to 
dramatize the difference between the inevitable curve of the depicted 
event  –  the  onset  of  trauma  -  with  the  preternatural  calmness  of 
thought – the accession to beatific vision (“Only at the rim does the 
day tremble and shine”) beyond the banal (“she tells / him by shout 
 
accounting  for  the  language  of  affect  and  forms  of  affectivity),  and  the 
creative  relationship  between  both  language  and  world.  Here  we  might 
consider the epigraph given to Biting the Air, to wit, “Every property is the 
property of something, but it is not the property of just anything. / Ockham, 
Summa Logicae, I:24,” J.H. Prynne, Biting the Air (Cambridge: Equipage, 2003). 
At the same time, there is much in the work that does indeed defer questions 
of meaning and existence – but this is not nominalism. Here one would need 
to go further into Prynne’s study of Jakobsen on the relationship between 
sound and meaning, and the way in which Prynne’s poetic work increasingly 
explores a linguistic version of John Cage’s acoustic absolutism, a kind of 
weird and marvelous tension between a metaphysics and physics of sound. 
As a final example, consider the opening of To Pollen: “So were intern attach 
herded for sound particle / did affix scan to ultramont, for no matter broke / 
could level cell tropic.” J.H. Prynne, To Pollen (London: Barque Press, 2006), 
5. 
57 J. H. Prynne, “Of Movement Towards a Natural Place,” Wound Response, 
12 / 223. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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down the staircase”
58). By contrast, Allen Ginsberg’s rejection of t he 
left-hand convention of western poetic orthography clearly applies to 
and informs “Again in the Black Cloud,” and, arguably, the entirety 
of Wound Response. Here is Ginsberg quoted in extenso from his Indian 
Journals (July 1962), from a section titled “Calcutta typed note. Hotel 
Amjadia: on Prosody, after a remark several years ago by W.C.W.”: 
 
There is no reason why every line must begin at the left 
hand  margin.  A  silly  habit,  as  if  all  the  thoughts  in  the 
brain  were  lined  up  like  a  conscript  army.  No,  thought 
flows freely thru the page space. Begin new ideas at margin 
and  score  their  development,  exfoliation,  on  the  page 
organically,  showing  the  shape  of  the  thought,  one 
association on depending indented on another, with space-
jumps  to  indicate  gaps  &  relationships  between  Thinks, 
broken  syntax  to  indicate  hesitancies  &  interruption.  – 
GRAPHING the movement of the mind on the page, as 
you  would  graph  a  sentence  grammatically  to  show  the 
relationbetween subjective verb & object in primary school 
– the arrangement of lines on the page spread out to be a 
rhythmic scoring of the accelerations, pauses & trailings-off 
of thoughts in their verbal forms as mouth-speech.  
[…] 
Easier than the arbitrary pattern of a sonnet, we don’t think 
in  the  dialectical  rigid  pattern  of  quatrain  or  synthetic 
pattern of sonnet: we think in blocks of sensation & images. 
IF THE POET’S MIND IS SHAPELY HIS ART WILL 
BE SHAPELY. That is, the page will have an original but 
rhythmic shape – inevitable thought to inevitable thought, 
lines dropping inevitably in place on the page, making a 
subtle infinitely varied rhythmic SHAPE.
59 
 
Leaving aside the comment on “the arbitrary pattern of a sonnet” – 
no form that is several centuries’ old could be said to be arbitrary – 
 
58 My emphasis on “down the staircase” to say how, again, the stanzaic shape 
becomes form in the action of the poem, the containment of movement and 
affect within the verticality of the poem. 
59 Allen Ginsberg, Indian Journals (1970) (New York: Grove Press, 1996), 40-
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one could not imagine a better, more telling description of the visual 
prosody of “Again in the Black Cloud” as a performance scored in 
and through a page space for “the movement of the mind.” Ginsberg 
shares with Prynne a commitment to composition in the field, even if 
there is no reason to believe that Prynne accepts wholesale the theory 
of projective prosody which underwrote the idea of composition in 
the field in Olson’s conception of that practice.
60 Ginsberg’s use of 
hallucinogenic drugs as means of exploration of affective states – “I 
have  with  me  two  bottles  of  Hallucinogen  pills  –  the  mescaline  & 
psilocybin”
61 – is not so far from the use of experimental subjects 
drawn  upon  in  Touch,  Heat  and  Pain  and  which  provides  Wound 
Response  with  its  content  (if  not  its  poetic  subject).  Here,  then,  is 
Ginsberg’s reporting of his experimentation with hallucinogenic pills 
and affective states: 
 
  The lesson of drugs is: 
    the experience of the sensation of 
  change of the physical body & brain, 
    change of brain consciousness 
      & how it feels to see  
      the inside-outside – 
        Snake biting its tale sensation 
  of the mind changing (the cellular 
    switchboard making new combinations 
      So the phone is phoning his 
        own number – 
      Whoever picks up the phone is you - ) 
  and seeing if you change the 
    cellular combination all the way 
      you get the final number 
        0000–∞
62 
 
 
60 Cf. Charles Olson, “Projective Verse” (1950), in James Scully, ed., Modern 
Poets on Modern Poetry (London: Collins, 1966, 1969), 271-82, and William 
Carlos Williams, “A New Measure” (1954), in James Scully, Modern Poets on 
Modern Poetry, 71-72. 
61 Allen Ginsberg, Indian Journals, 43. 
62 Allen Ginsberg, Indian Journals, 52-53. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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The visual prosody practiced by Ginsberg is an attempt at a form of 
measurement for “the experience of the sensation of / change of the 
physical body & brain,” an attempt, as it were, to catch in flow the 
“change of brain consciousness / & how it feels to see / the inside-
outside”  with  the  awareness  that  this  inevitably  entails  an  infinite 
regression  –  the  unavoidable  consequence  of  trying  to  capture 
immediate experience – to “0000- ∞ .” This is without doubt also the 
concern of Wound Response and “Again in the Black Cloud,” but it is 
practiced with more rigor and ambition as the poetry seeks to capture 
different kinds of knowledge, experiences and languages making its 
subject  in  part,  as  we  have  argued,  the  problem  of  equivalent 
descriptions in its depiction of the experience of electrical charges across 
the  synapses  during  an  experience  of  regression  consequent  upon 
extreme,  intense,  damage;  a  physical  damage  local  yet  systemic  in 
implication [in analogy with language] the marks of which are color-
predicates,  clouds,  and  discordant,  disarticulating  organic  rhythms. 
The  established  scientific  technology  for  the  measurement  of  such 
states for the “change of brain consciousness” is not, though, a poem, 
unless, that is, we see the stanzaic shaping of “Again in the Black 
Cloud” as more than an instance of post-Olsonian composition in the 
field – it is that, to be sure – but as an activity eminently readable but 
acoustically dumb, that is, an EEG indexically recording a state of 
collapse  in  such  a  way  that  technology,  observation  and  affect 
become imbricated in a powerful discourse of liminality, suspension 
and the experience of withdrawal from rigid forms of temporality into 
something in-between as autonomous structuration. 
  Let  us  consider  the  following  examples  from  the  greatest 
neurologist of the nineteenth-century, John Hughlings Jackson, whose 
central  contribution  was  in  the  diagnostic  description  and 
comprehension  of  the  action  of  epilepsy.  First,  let  it  be  noted  that 
Hughlings Jackson’s conception of epilepsy – or epileptic discharges 
or actions – covers a far wider range than might be expected. With 
this in mind, he gives the following definition: “Epileptic discharges 
are  occasional,  abrupt,  and  excessive  discharges  of  parts  of  the 
cerebral hemisphere (paroxysmal discharges).”
63 In characterizing the 
phenomenology  of  epileptic  experience  covering  a  wide  range  of 
 
63 John Hughlings Jackson, “On the Scientific and Empirical Investigation of 
Epilepsies,” Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson. Vol. 1: On Epilepsy and 
Eptileptiform Convulsions, ed., James Taylor (London: Staples Press, 1958), 177. GLOSSATOR 2 
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conditions  marked  by  diminished  consciousness,  he  notes  the 
preponderance of color terms in his patients’ language of self-reporting: 
 
A paroxysm of red vision, of strong smell in the nose, a 
paroxysm of vertigo, of spasm of certain parts of the body, 
tonic followed by clonic (of the hand and forearm, of the 
cheek, of the foot, of the whole of one side, going on or not 
into universal convulsion), of coloured vision, with other 
initial symptoms of an attack of migraine, are all epilepsies. 
So  also  is  transient  loss  of  consciousness,  or  loss  of 
consciousness followed instantly by convulsion. In each of 
these cases there is an abrupt and excessive discharge.
64 
 
In emphasizing the power of the discharge, its convulsive aspects, 
Hughlings Jackson comments: 
 
Not  only  is  it  very  much  more  excessive  than  the 
discharges which occur when we have faint mental states, 
but it is very much more excessive than those occurring in 
vivid mental states. [...] There is in some cases of epilepsy 
evidence  of  excessive  excitation  of  parts  of  the  brain 
representing retinal impressions, as the patient has  clouds of 
colour before his eyes.
65 
 
Color, clouds of colour, marks not only the onset of epilepsy but the 
moment  of  transition,  the  moment  when  the  subject  undergoes 
displacement  from the surety of its connectedness and  relations to 
body, frame and environment and suddenly becomes a spectator as 
though in a wholly new environment, a strange place, or as if in a 
strange country: 
 
Some  patients  will  tell  that  in  their  fits  they  are  not 
unconscious, but that they do not know where they are; 
that they hear people talking, but do not know what they 
 
64  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 182. 
 
65  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 181. My emphasis. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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say. It is not at all uncommon for the patient to say that 
when in a fit he feels as if in a strange place – “in a strange 
country,” one of my epileptic patients said.
66 
 
In a brief description, “Epileptiform Seizures - Aura from the Thumb 
- Attacks of Coloured Vision,” Hughlings Jackson presents the case of 
Alice F. “a married woman, aet. 49” who “‘had the colours dreadful.’ 
[...] The coloured vision was attended by pain in the right superciliary 
region. Both the pain and the colour came and went suddenly, lasting 
each time about ten minutes. [...] the colours were violet, white, and 
orange, and seemed about three yards distant.”
67 Not infrequently, 
such  attacks  in  which  the  patient,  as  just  reported,  does  not 
experience a complete loss of consciousness, open onto another state 
in  which  “the  patient  was  confused  but  was  quite  conscious.”
68 
Hughlings  Jackson  calls  the  actions  issuing  from  such  experiences 
post-paroxysmal actions, and, tellingly, they are actions “as elaborate and 
purposive-seeming as any of those of [the] normal self”;
69 the state of 
unconsciousness  itself  he  terms,  more  figuratively,  a  dreamy  state 
during  which  “there  were  post-epileptic  actions  by  Z  during 
‘unconsciousness,’ of a kind which in a man fully himself would be 
criminal.”
70 Throughout his writings on epilepsy, Hughlings Jackson 
works as a descriptive phenomenologist and always pays attention to 
his patients’ language as well as the role of language in classification 
and thinking, hence he comments 
 
 
66  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 187. My emphases. 
67  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Epileptiform  Seizures  -  Aura  from  the  Thumb  - 
Attacks of Coloured Vision,” Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson. Vol. 1: 
On Epilepsy and  Eptileptiform Convulsions, ed., James Taylor (London: Staples 
Press, 1958), 2. 
68  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 188. 
69  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
‘Dreamy State’,” Selected Writings of John Hughlings Jackson. Vol. 1: On Epilepsy 
and Eptileptiform Convulsions, ed., James Taylor (London: Staples Press, 1958), 
460. My emphasis. 
70  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
‘Dreamy State’,” 460. GLOSSATOR 2 
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that,  although  medical  men  speak  clinically  of  loss  of 
consciousness  as  if  it  were  a  well-defined  entity  called 
consciousness,  there  is  probably  not  amongst  educated 
persons  any  such  belief.  We  must  for  clinical  purposes 
have arbitrary standards (definitions by type). It is thus the 
universal custom of medical men to speak of “confusion,” 
“stupor,”  “loss  of  consciousness,”  and  “coma,”  although 
every  medical  man  sees  cases  in  which  there  are  all 
conceivable degrees from slightest confusion of thought to 
deepest coma.
71 
 
The utterances of Z in the emergence, that is, the  transition from this 
dreamy state (“The famous dreamy state, the uncinate seizure […], 
with its illusions, its ecmnesia, its paramnesia, its rushes of dreams, its 
anxiety  and  nightmare-filled  atmosphere”
72)  as  recorded  by 
Hughlings Jackson, were such as  
 
For about the last fortnight about the legs are about the 
gradual for several debts of the [;] 
 
and: 
 
There [then a word obliterated] was constant repetition of 
sickness  for  the  last  twenty-four  hours.  Abdomen  [this 
word crossed out]. The sick [...] on the grateful rightness 
has felt a large knowfulness.
73 
 
As  we  return  to  Hughlings  Jackson’s  report  of  his  patient  Z  it  is 
crucial that we understand that internally – that is, for the patient – 
experiencing  his  condition  there  was  a  subjective  awareness  of 
continuity, hence Hughlings Jackson comments, “In his slight attacks 
there was, he told me, a sentence in his mind which was as if well 
 
71  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 187. 
72  Henry  Ey,  Consciousness:  A  Phenomenological  Study  of  Being  Conscious  and 
Becoming  Conscious  (1963),  trans.  John  H.  Flodstrom  (Bloomington:  Indiana 
University Press, 1975), 186. 
73  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
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remembered. For example, if anyone was at the time speaking to him 
it would be as if he (Z) were trying to remember it, as if it were 
familiar, but yet he could not remember it. Again he said – I give the 
words I hastily wrote in my case-book, here intercalating other words 
in square brackets – ‘attending to what was going on in [my] mind 
because [it was] interesting, and dim to what [was] going on outside.’ 
He could not, on recovery, remember what the ‘interesting matter’ 
was.”
74 The many examples of Z’s language recorded by Hughlings 
Jackson are all filled with pathos. Here, as Hughlings Jackson puts it, 
is another specimen: 
 
For the last few days his beginning (starting to walk?) is 
more  difficult  for  his  tenderness  of  speechlessness  and 
quick  power  of  talk  light  swollenness  of  feet  last  three 
days.
75 
 
The utterances and articulations of patient Z make sense in many 
different ways, but largely they make sense privatively: they are like 
fossils  of  an  unreconstructable  past  at  the  same  time  as  they 
themselves actively register failure, inability, unsuccessful attempts, 
that  is,  actions,  a  powerful  aspect  of  which  is  their  rhythms  of 
blockage - especially important here is the demonstrative adjective the 
-  
 
For about the last fortnight about the legs are about the for 
several  debts  of  the  (Z  adds,  “no  connection  in  thought 
traceable for the word ‘debts’.”)
76 
 
Clearly,  the  demonstrative  the  is  seeking  its  noun:  the  syntactical 
failure  here registers as  phenomenological, that is, it embodies the 
movement of experience, it  articulates and expresses it:  expression 
and representation - the articulations we call discursive formations - 
are not separate but necessarily different moments of an act: one is 
 
74  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
‘Dreamy State’,” 458-459. 
75  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
‘Dreamy State’,” 460.      
76  Hughlings  Jackson,  “Case  of  Epilepsy  with  Tasting  Movements  and 
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not  superior  to  the  other,  though  it  can  fairly  be  said  that  poetic 
language of this kind is concerned more with the expressive moment 
of  representation  since  failure  at  the  discursive  level  necessarily 
pointed  either  to  distortion  or  to  some  aspect  of  the  expressive 
medium as flawed (in the neurological sense, for example) which may 
then  become  paradigmatic  for  alternative  modes  of  attention.  In 
diction, in imagery, in rhythm – one might even say, in prosody – 
and  phenomenology  of  experience  we  are  on  the  same  terrain  as 
Wound  Response  and  its  phenomenology  of  language  and  sub-  and 
supra-liminal autonomy explored in “Again in the Black Cloud”: 
 
            Air to blood 
        are the two signs, flushed with the sound: 
          (a) “tended to refrain from aimless wandering” 
          (b) “experienced less dizziness” 
          (c) “learned to smile a little” 
          (d) “said they felt better and some indeed 
                seemed happier” — 
 
Through this diction of itemization there is a dueling of language(s): 
first, the items of observation which firmly and definitively withhold 
any pronominal identification thereby blurring any line between the 
language  of  observation  and  the  language  of  self-reporting  –  the 
model for which is Hughlings Jackson, or at the very least the type of 
which is that provided in Hughlings Jackson, consistently understood 
as an infrastructural poetic language of the kind, for example, found 
in Celan’s “Gespr￤ch im Gebirg” (Conversation in the Mountains, 
1959)  where  the  folding  of  the  earth  (“once  and  twice  and  three 
times”
77), with water colored “green, and the green is white” (GG 25 / 
19), is a demonstrative language (“the language that counts here, the 
green with the white in it,” GG 25 / 19) but also “a language not for 
you and not for me […] a language, well, without I and without You, 
nothing but He, nothing but It, you understand, and She, nothing but 
that.” (GG 25 / 19-20.) The passage (a), (b), (c), to (d) renders, too, 
 
77 Paul Celan, “Gespr￤ch im Gebirg” (1960), Der Meridian und andere Prosa 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988), 25; Paul Celan, “Conversation in the 
Mountains,” Collected Prose, trans. Rosemarie Waldrop (Manchester: Carcanet 
Press,  1986),  19.  All  subsequent  citations  from  this  work  will  be  in  text, 
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the sense that some thing is being looked at - become a third-person 
objection - in the course of being objectified, in the way that not only 
people,  but  feelings,  emotions  and  pain  can  be  studied  in 
experimental conditions of the kind framed in the Ciba Foundation 
symposium on Touch, Heat, and Pain, but found, too, in raw, brute 
poetic forms in the reporting of Hughlings Jackson. In this respect, 
the diction of itemizing becomes part of a discourse upon objectness, in 
an occluded manner befitting the mode of thematising, of shadowing 
another language upon personhood whose poetic virtue is the curious 
quality  of  suspension  that  surrounds  the  passages,  the  actions  in 
quotation marks: 
 
    (a)  “tended to refrain from aimless wandering” 
    (b)   “experienced less dizziness” 
    (c)  “learned to smile a little 
    (d)  “said they felt better and some indeed 
        seemed happier” […]. (WR 20 / 230) 
 
The quality of suspension conveyed by this indetermination between 
third-person,  passive  positionality  and  a  loss  of  directed 
temporalization  in  superposition  is  due  not  only  to  the  lack  of 
pronominal  identification,  but  also  to  the  way  in  which  (i)  the 
itemization slows the reading process almost to a halt, and (ii) and the 
way  in  which  passivity,  in  the  constructions  (a),  (b),  (c),  and  (d), 
becomes the norm from the beginning of the poem’s actions where 
“Shouts rise again” and “flecks of cloud skim over / to storm-light.” 
This  tension  of  the  implied  external  observation  point  with  the 
floating  internal  experience  of  vague  attending  in  diminished 
consciousness – the tension, too, between the indexical recording of 
the  EEG  and  the  silence  of  the  subjection  on  which  the  event  of 
recording is predicated - points not only to differing temporalities but 
to a discourse on personhood: at what point, under what conditions 
does a given use of language no longer require the supposition that 
the “object” of its address be any longer a person, a subject? At what 
temporal “moment,” under what phenomenological conditions of self-
experience does “one” cease to be a “person”?  Might the occlusion of 
language in its “medico-social” usage give a paradigm for this possibly 
constitutive  relation  between  “language”  and  “personhood”?  Here 
one might think of the language of an emergency room situation with 
a doctor looking at the EEG (measuring the electrical activity of the 
brain, not necessarily for the diagnosis of epilepsy) as well as glancing GLOSSATOR 2 
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at the patient, shouting, “She’s fading, she’s fading! She’s gone.” (See, 
here, fig.1 and the rectangular band on the cover of Wound Response as 
a sign of a particular steady-state movement….) What was fading? 
When did it begin to fade? And when was it gone? Was the doctor 
addressing the EEG or some comparable instrument of measurement, 
the body, or the person? Did the instrument, in other words, stand in 
for  the  patient  in  some  manner  more  than  merely  heuristic?  No 
sooner can these questions be posed than the rhythm of the poem 
suddenly picks up and begins to move with rapidity from the vocal 
field of inferred human activity to another acoustic field (rich in signs) 
marked  by  an  identification  with  animality  in  the  form  of  snow-
beasts: 
     
              Air to blood 
        are the two signs, flushed with the sound: 
          (a) “tended to refrain from aimless wandering” 
          (b) “experienced less dizziness” 
          (c) “learned to smile a little” 
          (d) “said they felt better and some indeed 
           seemed happier” —out in the 
          snow-fields the aimless beasts 
mean what they do, so completely the shout 
          is dichroic in gratitude, 
          half-silvered, the 
          gain control set for “rescue” at 
          negative echo line.
78 The clouds now “no longer 
giving light but full of it,” the entry condition a daze 
         tending to mark zero. Shouting and 
laughing and intense felicity given over, rises 
       under the hill as tinnitus aurium, hears the 
    child her blue 
   coat! his new 
    shoes and boat! 
 
 
78 Negative echo here might point to yet another variant of cloud iconology if 
taken to point to clouds of ultracold (Fermionic) gases at the crossover mark 
of localized density disturbances, hence the image chain thereby set with with 
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From the language of suspended states – neurological and categorial - 
the rhythm of the poem suddenly picks up and rushes out into the 
expanse  –  the  membrane  –  of  wildness  in  movements  and  shouts 
(“Shouting and / laughing and intense felicity”), returning to the color 
predicates for the intensity of the movements and shouts bordering 
on unbearable joy as concentrated in the pained acoustic perception 
embodied in tinnitus aurium understood as both pathological condition 
and synaesthetic state. At the same time, the language of the poem 
returns to the language of clouds also as a mark of intensity where  
 
The clouds now “no longer  
giving light but full of it,” 
 
come  with  the  clanging,  disjointed  rhythms  suggestive  of  raucous 
childlike play which, prosodically, one might almost scan as cretics (— 
x  —)  in  order  to  capture  the  discordancy  of  counterpointing 
movements: 
 
        hears the 
        child her blue 
        coat!  his new 
             shoes and boat! 
 
The concentration of sound, color and implied temporal regression 
suggests  a  variation  upon  the  language  of  interiority  found  in 
“Treatment in the Field” as well as “Again in the Black Cloud” as 
 
          The clouds now “no longer 
giving light but full of it,” the entry condition a daze 
        tending to mark zero. Shouting and 
laughing and intense felicity given over, rises 
       under the hill as tinnitus aurium, hears the 
        child her blue 
        coat!  his new 
                     shoes and boat! 
 
The clouds that are so filled with light that they daze, reduce to zero, 
serve to mark a gathering up of a rich and complex movement of 
affirmation and negation of cloud language in Prynne from the time 
of Day Light Songs in 1968 – that is, before and continuous with The GLOSSATOR 2 
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White Stones (1969) – Voll Verdienst
79 (first published in Poems, 1982 but 
manifestly  continuous  with  Day  Light  Songs)  through  Into  the  Day 
(1972) and Wound Response (1974) and up to an including The Oval 
Window in 1983 where each sequence sets the idea of journey not 
merely in terms of the boundary between interior and exterior, but 
does  so  through  a  radical  language  of  materiality  based  in 
neurological experiences for which the imaginal language of clouds is 
the mark of a regulative indistinction of situatedness, of boundary 
and  place  relocated  and  conceived  in  partly  Aristotelian,  partly 
Bergsonian, but largely post-Jacksonian terms as neural space as the 
form taken in this poetry and poetics of the question of place (the figures 
of  which  range  from  the  possible  gases  of  superconductivity  -  the 
negative echo line in the black cloud - to the oval window of the inner 
ear).  If  the  dominant  controlling  figure  of  autonomy  in  Wound 
Response is the central nervous system in a state of brietal infusion – 
that is, artificially or experimentally induced narcosis – the image of 
autonomy in The Oval Window is the same principle now transferred 
to the mechanism of the inner ear – the oval window
80 – but both are 
linked through the middle term of neural space, and as such become 
topological transforms of each other, precisely, the language deployed 
in the  poem  “Of Movement Towards a  Natural Place”  where  the 
wound (“the charge”) not yet a physically observable bruise “is still 
there  in  neural  space,”  which  is  then  glossed  through  a  direct 
quotation from Touch, Heat and Pain as 
 
79 Cf. J.H. Prynne, Voll Verdienst (undated), in Poems (Edinburgh and London: 
Agneau 2, 1982), 33-36. 
80  In this respect, though  gratitude i s due to Nigel Reeve and Richard 
Kerridge for their pioneering interpretation of  The Oval Window, W. Ritchie 
Russell’s comment in his review of Touch, Heat and Pain that “The anatomy 
and physiology of sensation are both still, in many respects, most obscure” is 
pertinent to issues of the ear / hearing (and for both the import of electron 
microscopy photography) precisely for the constructive use of obscurity, the 
running up against the limits of language and representation. Cf. N.H. Reeve 
and Richard Kerridge, “The Oval Window,” Nearly Too Much: The Poetry of J.H. 
Prynne (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1995), 147-191. This chapter 
was subsequently expanded as “Deaf to Meaning: On J.H. Prynne’s The Oval 
Window,”  Parataxis  /  available  through  the  online  journal  Jacket,  no.  20, 
December 2002; see, too, the excellent interview with the artist Ian Friend, 
Richard  Humphrey,  “Drawing  on  Prynne:  Tacit  Conversations  with  Ian 
Friend and his Work,” in Ian Brinton, ed., A Manner of Utterance: The Poetry of 
J.H Prynne (Exeter: Shearsman Books, 2009), 36-50. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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           “By this I mean a distribution 
of neurons … some topologically preserved transform”  
(WR 12 / 223). 
 
The cloud so full of light that it dazes, renders to a condition of zero, 
is also linked to (a crazed, a touched) sounding in Day Light Songs in 
multiple ways: first through the descended light (of sanctity) called a 
halo: 
 
Do not deny this halo 
    the shouts are 
against nothing we all 
    stand at variance 
we walk slowly if it 
    hurts we rant it 
is not less than true oh 
    love I tell you so  
    (Poems, 29) 
 
but also by implicit allusion to the elements of breath, of sigh (“Who 
shall make the / sigh,” Poems, 28) that, with impulse, will make for 
sound as well as mark the threshold, the experience of passage and 
transition,  whence  the  apophatic  dimension  always  present  in 
multiple registers (literary, meteorological, cosmological, theological) 
of the title “Again in the Black Cloud” is made intelligible by reference 
to the opening lyric of Day Light Songs which opens on the topos of 
breathing as the essence of poetry (following Rilke, Celan, but also 
Wordsworth)  
 
Inhale  breathe deeply and [.] 
 
Then, simply, mysteriously – as though Wallace Stevens’ “The Poem 
that took the Place of a Mountain” encountered the ascent to Sinai 
(“the book […] in dust,”) which reminded how one had “Shifted the 
rocks and picked his way among the clouds”
81 – there is the rendition 
 
81     There it was, word for word, 
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of  apartness,  signaled  and  enacted  through  the  blank  space  after 
Inhale, with a mountain – the mountain - surfacing in the lucid, divine 
indicative calm of thereness: 
 
Inhale    breathe deeply and 
  there the mountain 
       is there are 
  flowers streams flow 
simple bright goods clutter 
       the ravines the 
air is thin and heady 
  the mountain 
respires, is equal to 
       the whole 
  (Poems, 26) 
 
 
  The poem that took the place of a mountain. 
 
  He breathed its oxygen, 
  Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table. 
 
  It reminded him how he had needed 
  A place to go in his own direction. 
 
  How he had recomposed the pines, 
  Shifted the rocks and picked his way among the clouds, 
 
  For the outlook that would be right, 
  Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion: 
 
  The exact rock where his inexactnesses 
  Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had edged, 
 
  Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea, 
  Recognize his unique and solitary home. 
 
Wallace Stevens, “The Poem that took the Place of a Mountain,” The Collected 
Poems (New York: Knopf, 1954, 1982), 512. 
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which figures the moment of liminality propadeutic to transfiguration 
such as is found, for example, in the Buddha’s Fire-Sermon, in Jesus’ 
Sermon on the Mount, no less than in Moses ascent to Mount Sinai, 
the  medium  of  which  transfiguration  is  the  voice.  The  encounter 
based upon an acoustic performance is an approach taken up and 
reworked  in  the  staging  of  Celan’s  “Gespr￤ch  im  Gebirg” 
(Conversation in the Mountains). Celan’s “Gespr￤ch im Gebirg” will 
figure  the  preparation  for  the  vocal  encounter  under  the  aegis  of 
clouds (Gewölk), when  
 
One evening, when the sun had set and not only the sun, 
the Jew […] went off one evening when various things had 
set, went under clouds, went in the shadow, his own and 
not his own (GG 23 / 17) 
 
and, moreover, draws upon Büchner’s Lenz: 
 
so he went off and walked along this road, this beautiful, 
incomparable  road,  walked  like  Lenz,  through  the 
mountains. (GG 23 / 17) 
 
This passage cannot, of course, but recall Moses’ ascent of Mount 
Sinai where Jahweh will encounter him in a dark cloud (Exodus 19, v. 
9), or where Moses approached the dark cloud where God was (Exodus 20, v. 
21),
82 there, in the language of Day Light Songs where the “air is thin & 
heady,” and “So much is just / by pulse.” (Poems, 26.) Moses’ walk 
(into  fire,  into  the  dark  cloud)  is  an  ascent,  Lenz’  walk  into  the 
mountains (“when the storm forced the clouds down into the valleys 
[…] or when the clouds reared up like wildly whinnying horses […]; 
or when the stormwind blew the clouds down and away […] and tiny 
clouds drifted pass on silver wings”
83) is a collapse and the model for 
Celan’s vocal landscape of transfiguration (“The earth [is] folded up 
here,”  GG  25  /  19,  my  emphasis)  which  is  also  the  language  of 
emergent  poetic  experience.  Likewise  does  Prynne’s  language  of 
poetic  experience  (fictional,  biographical,  fictive)  take  in  its  walks: 
with Coleridge (out of doors, there where sound is generative of its 
 
82  Cf.  Denys  Turner,  “The  Allegory  and  Exodus,”  The  Darkness  of  God: 
Negativity in Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: CUP, 1995, 1999), 16-18. 
83 Georg Büchner, Lenz, 249-250. GLOSSATOR 2 
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own world “more sublime than any sight can be, more absolutely 
suspending  the  power  of  comparison”),  with  Celan  (with  Lenz  through 
Celan, and Celan through Büchner), with Büchner (and Lenz, and 
Celan), but above all with Hölderlin, the Hölderlin of “In lieblicher 
Bläue…” from which the title Voll Verdienst is derived, a lyric sequence 
composed,  as  I  have  suggested,  in  a  manner  continuous  with  Day 
Light Songs and the concerns of Wound Response.  
  “Voll  Verdienst,  doch  dichterisch,  wohnet  des  Mensch  auf 
dieser  Erde”:
84  “Full  of  acquirements”  is  Hamburger’s  early 
translation of “Voll Verdienst”: “Full of acquirements, but poetically, 
man  dwells  on  this  earth.”
85  “Full  of  merit”  is  Albert  Hofstadter’s 
attempt in his translation of Heidegger: 
 
Full of merit, yet poetically, man 
Dwells on this earth
86  
 
which attempt maintains Stefan Schimanksi’s translation from 1949: 
 
Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells 
Man on this earth.
87 
 
Richard Sieburth renders it as “Well deserving”: 
 
Well deserving, yet poetically 
 
84 Friedrich Hölderlin, “In lieblicher Bl￤ue...,” Sämtliche Werke, 372. 
85  Friedrich  Hölderlin,  “In  lieblicher  Bl￤ue…,”  Poems  and  Fragments,  trans. 
Michael Hamburger (London: Routledge and Paul, 1966), 601. 
86  Cf.  Martin  Heidegger,  “...  Poetically  Man  Dwells  ...,”  Poetry,  Language, 
Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Colophon, 1975), 216. 
87  Martin  Heidegger,  “Hölderlin  and  the  Essence  of Poetry,”  Existence  and 
Being (trans. Stefan Schimanski) ((South Bend, IN.: Regnery,  1949, 1979), 
282. Existence and Being (with an introduction and analysis by Werner Brock, 
then  at  the  University  of  Cambridge),  is  a  translation  of  Heidegger’s 
Erläuterungen  zu  Hölderlins  Dichtung  (1936),  and  is  the  first  selection  of 
Heidegger’s work to be published in English. Erläuterungen is the same volume 
translated by Corbin, Michel Deguy, Francois Fédier and Jean Launay as 
Approches de Hölderlin (Paris: Gallimard, 1962). I believe this early volume, 
Existence  and  Being,  is  of  more  than  passing  relevance  to  Prynne.  A  new 
translation  has  recently  appeared  as  Martin  Heidegger,  Elucidations  of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry (trans. Keith Hoeller) (Amherst: Humanity’s Books, 2000). Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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Man dwells on this earth,
88 
 
 whilst the French poet-translator André du Bouchet gives us “Riche 
en mérites” (rich in accomplishments, rich in merits),  
 
    Riche en mérites, mais poétiquement toujours, 
    Sur terre habite l’homme
89 
 
maintaining the earlier (1937) translation of Henry Corbin deployed 
in his French translation of Heidegger’s “Hölderlin et l’essence de la 
poésie”: 
 
    Riche en mérites, c’est poétiquement pourtant 
    Que l’homme habite sur cette terre
90 
 
 and accepted by Michel Deguy and Francois Fédier (1951) in their 
own translation of “Hölderlin et l’essence de la poésie” (based upon 
Corbin’s earlier translation).
91 But “doch” (adverb and conjunction) – 
all are agreed that “poetically man dwells on this earth,” but what of 
“doch”    -  the  caesura  thereby  created  -  which  becomes  but  for 
Hamburger,  yet  for  Sieburth,  pourtant  (yet,  however,  though)  for 
Corbin, and mais (but) for du Bouchet? There is an oddity about this 
passage, a privative sense that Heidegger was amongst the first to 
exploit,
92  as though that which is poetic in some way points to a 
diminution:  
 
88 Cf. Friedrich Hölderlin, “In lieblicher Blaue …,” Hymns and Fragments, trans. 
Richard Sieburth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 249. 
89  Cf.  Friedrich  Hölderlin,  “En  bleu  adorable…,”  Oeuvres,  ed.,  Philippe 
Jaccottet (Paris:Galliamrd, 1967), 939. 
90 Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin et l’essence de la poésie” (trans. by Henry 
Corbin), Mésures, no. 3, 1937, 120-143; rpd. Martin Heidegger, Qu’est-ce que la 
métaphysique?  Suivi  d’extraits  sur  l’être  et  le  temps  et  d’une  conférence  sur 
Hölderlin (trans. Henry Corbin) (Gallimard: Paris,1938, 1951), 244. 
91 Cf. Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin et l’essence de la poésie” (trans. Michel 
Deguy and Francois Fédier), Approches de Hölderlin (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), 
53. 
92 Cf. Martin Heidegger who writes: “Before it are the words: ‘Full of merit, 
yet ....’ They sound almost as if the next word, ‘poetically,’ introduced a 
restriction on the profitable, meritorious dwelling of man.” Martin Heidegger, 
 GLOSSATOR 2 
206 
 
  Voll Verdienst, doch dichterisch, wohnet des Mensch auf  
    dieser Erde,  
 
all the more so when it is taken into account that Verdienst can also 
point  to  deserving  or  deserts,  as  “man  wird  ihn  nach  Verdienst 
behanden:  he  will  be  treated  according  to  his  deserts,”  that  is, 
according to rank, according to what befits, but no less, too, than 
what  he  deserves,  that  is,  the  implicit  sense  of  judgment  which 
allowed  Hamlet,  as  is  well  known,  to  reply  to  Polonius’  innocent 
comment about hospitality towards the players, “My lord, I will use 
them according to their desert,” 
 
God’s bodkin, man, much better. Use every man after his 
desert, and who should ’scape whipping? Use them after 
your own honour and dignity: the less they deserve, the 
more merit is in your bounty.
93 
 
What, indeed, should be left of us if we were to receive our just 
deserts? There is, in this short passage from Hamlet, a whole lesson on 
commentary as well as in commentary for the German Verdienst, the 
French mérite, and the English desert and deserve and their cognates, a 
lesson rich in exegetical as well as soteriological implications. Hence 
why  the  title  of  the  short  lyrics  of  Prynne’s  Voll  Verdienst  remains 
untranslated, but whose presence in a suite of English poems comes 
with adjacent histories and commentaries from Hamlet to Heidegger.  
  This is the point at which in many a reflection upon Prynne’s 
work the reading becomes positively mediated by Heidegger, but this, 
rather, is precisely the moment that requires differentiation, where it 
needs be noticed that the poetry is both responsive to yet departs 
from  Heidegger’s  thought  and  his  violent  reading  of  Hölderlin. 
Heidegger’s reading is indeed pertinent to Prynne’s poetics, as also 
the  nature  of  the  movement  of  the  poetry,  that  is,  the  manner  in 
which it walks with other poetries and in bringing certain poetries 
into  new  alignments  and  configurations  thereby  sets  up  new 
 
“…  Poetically  Man  Dwells  ...,”  Poetry,  Language,  Thought  (trans.  Albert 
Hofstadter) (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), 216. 
93  William  Shakespeare,  Hamlet,  II.ii.524-  527,  Harold  Jenkins,  ed.,  The 
Arden Shakespeare (London and New York: Methuen, 1982). Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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interpretative  chambers  of  reception,  not  only  between  philosophy 
and  poetry,  Heidegger’s  main  concern,  but  also  science,  or,  to  be 
more  precise,  the  language  of  science  understood  not  only  as 
knowledge  produced  by  a  certain  methodology  understood,  by 
Heidegger, to be an objectifying form of experience, but, for Prynne, 
where  science  is  understood  as  a  form  of  knowledge  capable  of 
entering the cloud of ignorance from which a new set of questions, 
languages and preoccupations can be formulated, whence the demand 
for  materiality  in  Prynne’s  poetry,  a  materiality  provided  by 
neurology and relatedly the science concerned with the incomparably 
small (the oval window) which can only be revealed to human vision 
through  technologies  of  magnification  (electron  microscopy). 
Heidegger’s question of dwelling, by which he approaches Hölderlin’s 
late poetry, that is the poetry of Hölderlin’s madness (c. 1805-1843), 
is certainly relevant to Prynne, as can be seen from the way in which 
Heidegger registers the privative dimension of the famous utterance: 
 
Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells 
Man on this earth.
94 
 
Heidegger  comments  (in  the  Schimanski -Brock  translation  of 
Erläuterungen): 
 
What  man  works  at  and  pursues  is  through  his  own 
endeavours earned and deserved. “Yet” – says Hölderlin in 
sharp antithesis, all this does not touch the essence of his 
sojourn on this earth, all this does not reach the foundation 
of being-there. The latter is fundamentally “poetic.” But we 
now  understand  poetry  as  the  inaugural  naming  of  the 
gods and of the essence of things. 
  To “dwell poetically” means: to stand in the presence 
of the gods and to be touched by proximity to the essence 
of things. Being-there is “poetic” in its fundamental aspect – 
which means at the same time: in so far as it is founded, it 
is not something merited, but a gift.
95 
 
94  Martin  Heidegger,  “Hölderlin  and  the  Essence  of Poetry,”  Existence  and 
Being, 282. 
95  Martin  Heidegger,  “Hölderlin  and  the  Essence  of Poetry,”  Existence  and 
Being, 282-83. Translation modified.      GLOSSATOR 2 
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Clearly for Prynne, Heidegger’s formulation of the question of the 
gods  will  not  be  his,  though  there  will  indeed  be  question  of  the 
sacrality of naming. The strong antithetical doch / yet of Hölderlin’s 
language hinges, indeed, upon the radical movement entailed in being 
“touched  [betroffen]
96  by  proximity  to  the  essence  of  things,” 
knowledge of which may well be considered a gift, but Prynne and 
Heidegger, as practioners of thought, will take the implication of this 
sense of radical contrastive movement in different senses of truth and 
the understanding of science. The conclusion at which Heidegger’s 
poetics arrives about the role of truth as A-letheia (unconcealedness), 
the image of which is that of light being torn away from darkness, as 
distinct  from  scientific  truth  which  is  conceived  as  a  violence  of 
abstraction imposed through a violent language of objectivity, this is 
not the conclusion of Prynne’s poetry or the means of its poetics. In 
this respect, Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin, which should be no 
surprise,  is  over-determined.  There  is,  though,  a  passage  in 
Heidegger’s  Hölderlin reflections where, tellingly, he speaks of the 
nature of poetic experience in Hölderlin as the experience of the in-
between:  Heidegger’s  term  for  the  condition  of  Hölderlin’s  in-
betweeness  is  Zwischenbereich,  which  I  should  translate  less  as  the 
kingdom of the Between – though this is by no means incorrect – 
than as the field or zone (Bereich) of the Between (Zwischen), close, 
indeed, to Freud’s characterization of the analyst’s experience, that is, 
the experience that befalls the one who must first receive and  bear 
(carry,  support)
97  what  is  received,  the  initially  (and  perhaps 
 
96 Heidegger’s text says that poetic dwelling is “stehen und betroffen sein von 
der  Wesensn￤he  der  Dinge,”  where  “betroffen”  is  the  past  participle  of 
betreffen,  the  sense  of  which  is  to  be  disconcerted,  dazed,  confounded, 
perplexed  in  and  by  the  near  essence  (proximity)  of  things,  hence  my 
modifying the translation to speak of being touched with its hint or suggestion 
of derangement or disorientation. Consider that in a slightly older English 
colloquialism than is now current one could refer to some one “not all there” 
as “a bit touched.” Cf. Martin Heidegger,  “Hölderlin und das Wesen der 
Dichtung,” Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klosterman, 1981), 42. 
97  Here  consider  Jacques  Derrida’s  question:  “Que  veut  dire  porter?  Nous 
nous sommes déj￠ souvent demandé, en plus d’une langue, ce que signifie 
porter, to carry, to bear, tragen, en particulier […], pour tenter de cerner le sens 
de Walten, autour de Austrag, à savoir une sorte de contrat de la différence 
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permanently)  unintelligible  transfers  of  affect  from  another,  as 
Zwischenreich,  the  domain  or  kingdom  of  Betweeness,  and 
interregnum. J.-B. Pontalis, who has made this hint from Freud on in-
betweeness (entre in French) a presence in his attempt to think the 
fluidity  of  the  non-conceptual,  has  characterize  this  condition  of 
passivity  as  the  intermediary:  “as  analysts  and  perhaps  as  human 
beings,  we  are  fated  [voués],  to  remain  in  what  Freud  named  in 
certain passages Zwischenreich.”
98 It is here, in the thinking of the field 
of the open of the Between, the Zwischenbereich, that the difference and 
relation of Prynne to Heidegger’s reading can be grasped. 
  In  developing  his  reading  of  Hölderlin,  Heidegger  makes 
frequent recourse to mediation, but it is not, of course, a materialist 
conception  of  mediation  in  play,  rather  it  is  hermeneutic,  for, 
consistent with the conception of truth as A-letheia, that that which is 
is  the  act  of  being  uncovered,  unconcealed,  revealed,  as  that  with 
which  Dasein  is  in  a  primordial  attunement.  The  poet,  of  which 
Hölderlin is the type, for Heidegger, is he who  is open to the signs of 
the gods, whence Heidegger quotes the following as example of how 
the gods speak: 
 
… and the signs to us from antiquity are the language of the gods 
 
which it is the nature of the speech of the poet, that is, in what poetic 
language consists, to expose itself to such signs, in other words: “The 
speech of the poet is the intercepting of these signs, in order to pass 
them on to his own people.”
99 Indeed, it is said that “The foundation 
of being is bound to the signs of the gods. And at the same time 
poetic speech [utterance] is only the interpretation of the ‘voice of the 
people.’ This is how Hölderlin names the saying in which a people 
remembers that it belongs to the totality of all that exists.”
100 This is 
the first sense of mediation relevant to Heidegger’s conception of the 
poet: the poet intercepts the signs of the gods and stands between the 
 
ontologique.”  Jacques  Derrida,  Séminaire:  La  Bête  et  le  souverain,  Volume  II 
(2002-2003) (Paris: Galilée, 2010), 357. 
98  J.B.  Pontalis,  “Penser  l’intérmediaire,”  in  Le  Royaume  intérmediaire: 
Psychanalyse, littérature, autour de J.-B. Pontalis (Paris: Gallimard, 2007), 317-318. 
99  Martin  Heidegger,  “Hölderlin  and  the  Essence  of Poetry,” Existence  and 
Being, 287.Translation modified. 
100 Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,”  Existence and 
Being, 287-288. Translation modified. GLOSSATOR 2 
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people and the signs of the gods: “In this way the essence of poetry is 
joined on to the laws of the signs of the gods and of the voice of the 
people, laws which tend towards and away from each other. The poet 
himself stands between the former – the gods, and the latter – the 
people.  He  is  the  one  who  has  been  thrown  out  –  out  into  that 
Between [jenes Zwischen], between [zwishcen] the gods and men. But 
only and for the first time in this Between [in diesem Zwishcen] is it 
decided, who man is and where he is settling his Dasein [wer der Mensch sei 
und woe er sein Dasein]. ‘Poetically, dwells man on this earth.’”
101 To 
be  sure,  Prynne  has  no  need  for  the  nationalist,  petit-bourgeois 
volkische Gewäsche of the National Poet presented by Heidegger, not 
least because, from “The Numbers” onward, the opening poem of 
Kitchen Poems, there is deep and abiding concern with discretion and 
brevity  along  with  a  commitment  to  scale  and  tact  at  odds  with 
Heidegger.  Even  as  Heidegger  seeks  to  make  of  Hölderlin  a 
national(ist) poet, the very letters of Hölderlin which he invokes, such 
as  the  letter  to  his  mother  dated  1  January  1799,  make  clear 
Hölderlin’s  cosmopolitanism  and  disdain  for  nationalism.  Here, 
Hölderlin’s case is strictly comparable to that of Nietzsche. What is 
operant in Prynne, however, is the idea of the open, of the field of the 
in-between condition where the question is open as to who (or what) is 
man and where he is settling his Dasein. The poet is not, as implied in 
Heidegger’s diction, something akin to Milton’s Satan secularized – 
the secularization of a sacred Gewalt -  since in this respect being “ein 
Hinausgeworfener”
102  (one  thrown  out,  cast  out)  is  a  modality  of 
Geworfenheit (throwness) which is a condition of Da-sein as such and so 
cannot be the distinguishing mark or condition of the poet as such; 
rather  the  poet  as  being  composite  with  language  through  which 
throwness might be grasped is the thinker of the conditions of the in-
between,  the  inter-regnum  of  orders  (linguistic,  cosmological, 
anthropological  and,  yes,  zoological),  the  one  sensitive  to  the 
exposure of the in-between where the danger of the condition of the 
in-between  –  for,  following  Hölderlin,  Heidegger  plays  with  the 
tension of poetry as an activity at once innocent and dangerous in the 
Hölderlinian  conception  –  is  articulated  in  and  through  the 
 
101 Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,”  Existence and 
Being, 288-289. Second emphasis mine. 
102  Martin  Heidegger,  “Hölderlin  und  das  Wesen  der  Dichtung,” 
Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, 47. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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availability or no of a second-order activity, the power or capacity, in 
other words, to give representation to what would otherwise remain 
immediate  (or  prepredicative  /  pre-linguistic  )  experience  (“How  / 
does he not feel a feeling,” it is said, for example, in “An Evening 
Walk,”  WR  16  /  227),  to  bring  within  the  field  of  attention  the 
energies  and  forces,  without  beginning  or  end,  which  make  for 
representation, of which the sudden movement and flow and rushing 
forth of images might be conceived as  the type.  Hence  Heidegger 
comments: “Unceasingly and ever more securely, out of the fullness 
of  the  images  pressing  about  him  and  always  more  simply,  did 
Hölderlin devote his poetic speech to the zone of the Between.”
103 
Prynne’s walk (Der Spatziergang) with Hölderlin takes this measure 
of simplicity inherent to the practice of late Hölderlin, keys it into the 
presence of cloud register and makes of it the means for rendering the 
sense of being touched by proximity to the essence of things at the threshold of 
equivalent  descriptions,  of  being  in  movement,  in  the  in-between 
zones of radical affection, that is, passivity, where the field is doubled-
valued at the divine point. 
  In the late work “An Zimmern” where the image of the walk is 
figured footpaths and lines of life: 
 
    The lines of life are various; they diverge and cease 
    Like footpaths and the mountains utmost end,
104  
 
which in Prynne’s Voll Verdienst will become the simplicity mediated 
by the  Lyrical Ballads but even more the Blake of “The Little Boy 
Lost,” “The Little Boy Found” and “Nurses Song,”
105 the near diction 
of nursery rime: 
   
  Follow the line the same 
      way down and  
 
103 Martin Heidegger, “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,”  Existence and 
Being, 289. Translation modified. 
104 Friedrich Hölderlin, “An Zimmern” (To Zimmer),  Poems and Fragments, 
589. 
105 William Blake, Songs Of Innocence and Of Experience, in David V. Erdman, 
ed., The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake (New York and London: 
Anchor Doubleday, 1988), 11 and 23. GLOSSATOR 2 
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     pale in the sky.
106 
 
The sky, pale, with or without clouds, is the mark and space of the 
open, the field of the in-between, there from which expulsion is felt, 
where fate rejects: 
 
  Leave in disgrace with 
    fortune in 
     her face & eye 
 
which openness is tracked through the moving calmness of the poem 
“Der Sommer,” the second and closing stanza of which reads: 
 
    So now the day moves on through the hill and valley, 
    Not to be stopped and in its beam arrayed, 
    And clouds move calmly on through lofty space 
    As though the year in majesty delayed 
 
suggesting the idyll of slowed, pastoral time reveals the possibility of 
loss in timelessness in its signature, under the mask of an assumed 
name,  “Your  humble  and  obedient  servant  Scardanelli,  March  9
th 
1940,”  a  type  of  imaginary  dating  entirely  characteristic  of  certain 
forms  of  schizoid  experience.  Throughout  the  late  poems,  the 
measure is calm, the tone one of marked control, the diction of great 
simplicity,  but  all  the  more  effective  then  the  transitions  to  or 
recognition of threat or violence,  for example in “Der Spaziergang” 
(The Walk), which opens: 
 
You wayside woods, well painted 
 
106 “Follow the line the same / way down.” If the language of cloud imagery 
is a privileged reflex in Prynne so, too, is the language of line and edge: “Only 
at the rim does the day tremble and shine” (WR 12 / 223); “the cells of the 
child line” and “the / child line dips into sleep” (WR 20 and 21 / 230 and 
231); the “negative echo line” (WR 20 / 230); from Into the Day:  “Here begins 
the world line of the sphere” (Poems, 213); “there / is shear at the flowline” 
(Poems, 214); or “the clear / margin” of “The Glacial Question, Unsolved” (The 
White Stones, 37 / 65). The examples can be multiplied, and may be the basis 
for  working  out  the  relationship  between  metonymy  and  metaphor  in 
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On the green and sloping glade 
Where I conduct my footsteps 
With lovely quiet repaid 
For every thorn in my bosom, 
When dark are my mind and heart 
Which paid from the beginning 
In grief for thought and art, 
 
and concludes, again with the auguries / omen of cloud language: 
 
The godhead [Gottheit] kindly escorts us, 
At first with unblemished blue, 
Later with clouds provided, 
Well rounded and grey in hue, 
With scorching flashes and rolling 
Of thunder, and charm of the fields, 
With beauty the swelling source of 
The primal image yields.
107  
   
This is the power of the open, the Godhead of “unblemished blue, / 
Later with clouds,” and “With scorching flashes,” the open which in 
“Patmos”  is  characterized  as  that  which  “Unceasingly  God 
disperses.”
108 In a letter to Casmir Ulrich Böhlendorff (4 December 
1801),  drawing  upon  Goethe’s  “Die  Grenzen  der  Menscheit”  (the 
boundaries / limits of mankind), we learn that Hölderlin, in opening 
himself to the world, believed that  the Ancient and holy Father  – 
Zeus – with a calm hand signals his disturbance, his benediction, in the form of 
lightning, through reddening clouds, which became for Hölderlin his sign 
of election: 
 
O friend! The world opens to me brighter and more grave 
than usual. Yes, what is happening pleases me as when in 
summer the ancient and holy Father,  “from the heights of 
reddening clouds, with a calm hand, pours down blessings 
in lightning.” For among everything that I can see of God, 
this sign has become my chosen one. Once, I could jubilate 
 
107 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Der Spazierung” (The Walk), Poems and Fragments, 
577. Translation very slightly modified. 
108 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos,” Poems and Fragments, 469. GLOSSATOR 2 
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about a new truth, a more just conception about what is 
above and around us; now, it is my fear that in the end I 
shall  be  submitted  to  the  same  fate  as  Tantalus  who 
received from the gods more than he could digest.
109 
 
As  fascinating  as  the  cloud  language  of  power  in  the  letter  to 
Böhlendorff is the manner in which Hölderlin declares not only the 
fear of receiving more than what one may be ab le to digest in the 
opening to the world, but equally that he cannot, on his  path, seek to 
be free from the derangement, the proximal touch of the gods, and 
further,  that  he  cannot  be  free  from  danger,  cannot,  indeed, 
comprehend a thinking of death in terms of simple oppositions: 
 
it  would  be  impious  and  utterly  mad  to  seek  a  path 
sheltered from all derangement, and there does not exist 
any simply oppositions to death.
110 
 
Heidegger is assuredly right to say that “The excessive brightness has 
driven the poet into darkness,”
111 and it is all too easy to see how this 
condition  will  be  picked  up  in  the  culture  of  post-Symbolism  and 
Surrealism beginning with the translation of Hölderlin’s late work by 
Pierre  Jean  Jouve  and  Pierre  Klossowski  as  Poëmes  de  la  folie  de 
Hölderlin  (1930)
112  which will, in turn, be taken up by the young, 
highly gifted English Surrealist David Gascoyne as Hölderlin’s Madness 
(1938),  a  set  of  free  adaptations
113  of Hölderlin interspersed with 
original work by Gascoyne which take as a guiding thre ad – in both 
the free adaptations and original work - this paradox of light and dark 
 
109 Friedrich Hölderlin, letter to Casimir Ulrich Böhlendorff, December 4, 
1801, in Essays and Letters on Theory, translated and edited by Thomas Pfau 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 151. Translation modified. 
110 Hölderlin, Essays and Letters, 151. Translation modified. 
111  Martin  Heidegger,“Hölderlin  and  the  Essence  of  Poetry,”  Existence  and 
Being, 285. Translation modified. 
112  Poëmes  de  la  folie  de  Hölderlin,  trans.  Pierre  Jean  Jouve  with  Pierre 
Klossowski  (Paris:  Fourcade,  1930),  rpd  in  Pierre  Jean  Jouve,  Oeuvres,  II 
(Paris: Mercure de France, 1987). 
113 “The poems which follow are not a translation of selected poems of Hölderlin, but a 
free  adaptation,  introduced  and  linked  together  by  entirely  original  poems.  The whole 
constitutes  what  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as  a  persona.”  David  Gascoyne, 
“Introduction,” Hölderlin’s Madness (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1938), 14. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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as  a  means  of  access  to  “the  secret  world  to  which  the  poet 
penetrates.”
114 See, for example, Gascoyne’s rendition of the fragment 
“An”  which,  partly  following  Jouve’s  French  rendering  as  “A 
(Diotima),” is given the English title, “To the Beloved (Diotima)”: 
 
  I would sing of thee 
    But only tears 
  And in the night in which I walk I see extinguish thy 
    Clear eyes! 
      O sprit of the Sky.
115  
 
Or hear the rendition of cloud language: 
 
    Often the inner world is closed and full of clouds, 
    Man’s mind perturbed and full of doubt.
116 
 
In  his  “Introduction,”  Gascoyne  observed  the  role  of  night  and 
sunlight in Hölderlin’s poetry, especially the poetry of the period of 
his  madness,  making  of  Hölderlin  one  of  the  poets  who  are 
“philosophers of nostalgia and the night. A disturbed night, whose 
paths  lead  far  among  forgotten  things,  mysterious  dreams  and 
madness.  And  yet  a  night  that  precedes  the  dawn,  and  is  full  of 
longing for the sun. These poets look forward out of their night; and 
Hölderlin in his madness wrote always of sunlight and dazzling air, 
and  the  islands  of  the  Mediterranean  noon.”
117  Here,  in  his  own 
poem “Tenebrae,” is how Gascoyne presents this imbrication of night 
and sunlight, “the endless night” of collapse and emergence, 
 
    The passing of the immaterial world in the deep eyes. 
 
    The granite organ in the crypt 
 
114 David Gascoyne, “Introduction,” Hölderlin’s Madness, 11. 
115 David Gascoyne, “To the Beloved (Diotima),” Hölderlin’s Madness, 36; cf. 
Friedrich Hölderlin, “An,” in Pläne und Bruchstücke, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2, 321. 
116  What  David  Gascoyne  here  translates  as  “Perspectives,”  Hölderlin’s 
Madness,  46  are  two  fragments  in  the  manuscripts  of  Hölderlin  titled 
“Aussicht,” and “Die Aussicht,” in Friedrich Hölderlin, Pläne und Bruchstücke, 
Sämtliche Werke, vol. 2, 292. Gascoyne also clearly draws upon Jouve’s version 
of “Aussicht” as “Vue,” in Poèmes de la folie de Hölderlin, in Oeuvres, II, 1999. 
117 David Gascoyne, “Introduction,” Hölderlin’s Madness, 2. GLOSSATOR 2 
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    Resounds with rising thunder through the blood 
    With daylight song, unearthly song that floods 
    The brain with bursting suns: 
    Yet it is night. 
 
    It is the endless night.
118 
 
It  is  this  language,  highlighted  by  Heidegger  and  the  culture  of 
Surrealism alike, of darkness in daylight  – of light that dazes – that 
Prynne’s poetry will resume and resituate in terms of a neurologically 
conditioned articulation of the zone of the in-between,
119 for example 
in The Oval Window’s rendition of the journey: 
 
118 David Gascoyne, “Tenebrae,” Hölderlin’s Madness, 41.   
119 The presence of fire, sun and light imagery is Prynne’s work is so well-
established as to be a reflex. Consider, for example, the following epigraph to 
the original publication of Aristeas, but which was not included in The White 
Stones where the poems of Aristeas were collected: 
 
‘He saw a fire infolding itself, and brightness about it; and that 
the fire also was bright; and that out of it went forth lightning; 
that the likeness of the firmament upon the living creatures, was 
the colour of the terrible crystal.’ John Bunyan, The Holy City; or, 
The New Jerusalem. 
(J.H. Prynne, epigraph, Aristeas (London: Ferry Press, 1968), 3.) 
 
Consider, too, the following passage from The English Intelligencer: 
 
The runic wynn is thus the fulfilled sign of joy, separation from 
which  is  the  exile  or  distance  of  hope,  desire,  love;  all  the 
projective excursions of motive which converge in longing and 
(so  they  say)  arrive  ultimately in  the  beautiful  recourse  of the 
blessed.  This  is  clearly  the  intent  of  the  runes  in    the  OE 
Husband’s Message, the power of promise and covenant to release 
the  attainment  of  feeling;  the  glyphic  message  has  been 
expounded as: “Follow the sun’s path (sigel-rā d) south across the 
ocean (ē ar), to find joy (wyn) with the man (mon) who is waiting for 
you” (Elliott, Runes, p.73; the whole poem is given in OE and 
Mod E translation in W.S. Mackie, ed., The Exeter Book, Part II, 
E.E.T.S.  1934).  Or,  with  a  less  narrative  sense  of  longing,  the 
runes can bind across distance, to empower and complete what 
they describe. 
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In darkness by day we must press on, 
giddy at the tilt of a negative crystal  
(The Oval Window, 33 / 338) 
 
and where the negative is marked by regression and failure of speech 
at a subliminal level (“almost below speech”): “The toy is childish, 
almost below speech” (The Oval Window, 33 / 338), which condition 
necessitates the terms of simple plea, again from Day Light Songs: 
 
    The whole cloud is bright 
    & assembled now 
we are drawn by simple 
        plea over 
     the membrane and its 
          folded parts 
into the point, and touch the 
 
(J.H. Prynne, “A Pedantic Note in Two Parts,” The English Intelligencer, 2
nd 
series, (June 1967), 352.) 
 
As a final example of the prevalence of this sensibility, consider the epigraph 
for To Pollen drawn from Gilgamesh: 
 
  Let my eyes see the sun and be sated with light. 
  The darkness is hidden, how much light is there left? 
       When may the dead see the rays of the sun? 
 
        Gilgamesh, Si I 13’ – 15’ 
  (J.H. Prynne, To Pollen (London: Barque Press, 2007), 3.) 
 
It may be suggested that the Prynnian poetic as it has developed since 1967 
has been to explore the means and conditions of binding with a less narrative 
sense. To read Prynne’s etymological reflections in The English Intelligencer, 
which journal must be seen as a laboratory of ideas in the way the great 
avant-garde journals such as La Révolution surréaliste, or Documents or L’Ephémère 
functioned for earlier generations, is to see at a glance why the encounter 
with Hölderlin was unavoidable. In all the talk of Olson and Dorn, we have 
missed the role of Hölderlin and the way that Hölderlin enables a connection 
to  Blake,  Wordsworth,  and  Celan,  and  subsequently  Andrea  Zanzotto. 
Prynne, in other words, as a European poet. GLOSSATOR 2 
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     air streaming away 
    (Poems, 31) 
 
the terms of which poem, shaped by the visual scansion, the spaced 
writing of Hölderlin’s fragments grasped as a form of composition in 
the field,
120 now function in new registers of neurology, beginning 
with the image of topology implied by “the membrane and its / folded 
parts / into the point,” that is, point as image of infinite density, as 
image of place – the imbrication of differing temporalities – so that 
membrane  and point together figure the question of place precisely 
there  where  the  inner  cloud  (or  “the  inner  world  […]  full  of 
clouds”
121) is the mark of collapse, of loss of (ordinary) consciousness 
–  Hughlings  Jackson’s  defective  consciousness.  This  signals  the 
condition in which negative experience, below the negative echo line, 
assumes the directive and 
 
we are drawn by simple 
        plea 
 
from within that condition / state, that “strange place,” that “strange 
country” shadowed by “clouds of colour,” and which, says Hughlings 
Jackson, “are supposed to be developments in a brutal way of the 
motor  and  sensory  elements  in  the  anatomical  substrata  of  visual 
ideas.”
122 The experience of Lenz, of the momentary, acoustic phases 
of consciousness depicted in “Again in the Black Cloud,” even the 
migraines of a Hildegard of Bingen as reported by the neurologist 
Oliver Sacks,
123 are states in which the neurology of heightened states 
will be indiscernible from the neurology of collapse – they will, in the 
language of this commentary, be equivalent descriptions – and mutatis 
 
120 The works which most directly bear the prosodic inflection of the spaced 
writing  and  visual  scansion  of  Hölderlin’s  Bruchstücke  (fragments)  are  Day 
Light Songs, Voll Verdienst, A Night Square (1971), and the poem “As grazing the 
earth…,” 1973, collected in Wound Response. 
121 David Gascoyne, “Perpectives,” Hölderlin’s Madness, 46. 
122  Hughlings  Jackson,  “On  the  Scientific  and  Empirical  Investigation  of 
Epilepsies,” 185. 
123 Cf. Oliver Sacks, “The Visions of Hildegard,” The Man Who Mistook His 
Wife for a Hat, and Other Clinical Tales (New York: Summit Books, 1985), 158-
162. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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mutandis for the experience of an inner or external spatiality, which 
may well be fictions of social ordering. (Prynne, it must be noted, has 
always been sensitive to this dimension of pure fiction in the work of 
Stevens and how, at times, it falls into narcissism – the type of which 
is “The Snow Man.” But a poem such as “Not Ideas about the Thing 
but the Thing Itself” captures to perfection the pivot on a threshold 
where sound and sun are the privileged figures of indiscernables.
124) 
Where Gascoyne, passing, it must be said, from Surrealism to a neo -
Romantic idiom, will write (through Hölderlin) of 
 
This severed artery 
The sand-obliterated face […] 
 
 
124 See Wallace Stevens, “Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself”: 
 
At the earliest ending of winter, 
In March, a scrawny cry from the outside 
Seemed like a sound in his mind. 
 
He knew that he heard it, 
A bird’s cry, at daylight or before, 
In the early March wind. 
 
The sun was rising at six, 
No longer a battered panache above the snow … 
It would have been outside. 
 
It was not from the vast ventriloquism 
Of sleep’s faded papier-m￢ché … 
The sun was coming from outside. 
 
That scrawny cry – it was 
A chorister whose c preceded the choir. 
It was part of the colossal sun, 
 
Surrounded by its choral rings, 
Still far away. It was like 
A new knowledge of reality. 
 
Wallace  Stevens,  “Not  Ideas  about  the  Thing  but  the  Thing  Itself,”  The 
Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens, 534. GLOSSATOR 2 
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Explosions of every dimension 
Directions run away 
Towards the sun […] 
The black sun in his blood
125  
 
the opening poem of Pynne’s Into the Day, in an imaginal language 
drawing upon Hölderlin, Celan and, especially, Trakl, will announce 
vigorously, in a clipped rhythm which, in its use of consonance and 
ceasura, seems to evoke a pre-Romance English prosody,
126 that  
 
Blood fails the ear, trips the bird’s 
fear of bright blue, 
 
before closing: 
 
             Blood then barred 
from the brain, sun in the sky, what’s 
lost is the hour spoken by heart.   
 
(Into the Day, n.p. /  Poems, 202) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 David Gascoyne, “Epilogue,” Hölderlin’s Madness, 47. 
126 Into the Day, with Day Light Songs, Fire Lizard (1970) and A Night Square 
(composed 1971, published 1973) form a diurnal sequence the language of 
which, dominated by the visionary landscape and the relation between joy 
and field, I think can be shown to have been shaped in the laboratory of The 
English Intelligencer, and so shaped at the time that the language of Hölderlin 
was  becoming  part  of  Prynne’s  emerging  poetics  in  tandem  with  his 
investigations of English and Germanic etymology as reserves of poetic and 
phonic potency. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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Fig. 3. Into the Day, 1972. Front cover, frontispiece, two internal 
illustrations, achevé d’imprimer 1972 and back cover 
 
          
       Fig. 3.1                Fig. 3.2 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.3 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.4 
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          Fig. 3.5              Fig. 3.6 
 
The difference between the language of  Into the Day and Hölderlin’s 
Madness  is  the  role  of  neurology:  the  threshold  phenomenon  is 
triggered by a neurological collapse such that the “sun in the sky” 
(fig. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6) will never be something that without 
any epistemological doubt can be situated beyond the brain or, in a 
diction  inflected  by  Celan,  by  retrieving  the  affect  for  “the  hour 
spoken by heart.”
127 The liminal condition is the condition of being, 
there where “Only at the rim does the day tremble and shine.” (WR 
12 /223) It is in this light, then, that one might be able to understand 
the difference in the attitude toward science and scientific languages 
on the part of Prynne in comparison with Heidegger, which will point 
to a different materiality, that is, a different conception of mediation, 
and evaluation of the field or zone of the in-between; in this light, too, 
that one might understand, from “Again in the Black Cloud,” that at 
the  moment  at  which  “Damage  makes  perfect”  the  language  of 
neurology  again  becomes  operative  in  its  description  of  the  non-
egocentric subjection of the Zwischenbereich as field of sleep: 
 
“reduced cerebral blood flow and oxygen utilisation 
are manifested by an increase in slow frequency waves, 
a decrease in alpha-wave activity, an increase in 
 
127  The  yellow  and  black  disks  of  Into  the  Day  (fig.  3.1  to  3.6)  can  be 
interpreted in terms of the fact that in our universe of discourse the human 
eye is configured to be most effective in yellow light, that is, the light of our 
sun.  In  terms  of  the  iconography  of  the  poem,  see  the  poem  beginning 
“Occulted by the great disk,” Into the Day, in Poems, 212. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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beta-waves, the appearance of paroxysmal potentials.” 
 
There  can  be  little  doubt  about  the  language  being  deployed.  As 
Damage makes perfect it introduces – through the colon – its continuity 
with  the  language  of  the  neurology  of  the  zone  of  sleep  through 
which is manifested the phenomenon of the disorganization of the 
field  of  consciousness.  Consider  the  following  relatively 
straightforward explanation from J.F. Stein for beta waves and alpha 
waves in the neurophysiology  of sleep: 
 
an  alert  subject  performing  strenuous  mental  arithmetic 
shows small (around 20 μV) randomly occurring potential 
fluctuations  of  EEG,  averaging  between  15  and  30  per 
second, known as beta (β) waves [fig. 4]. These are said to 
be desynchronized by comparison with alpha (α) waves which 
occur when the subject relaxes and closes his eyes.
128 
 
Consider, for the purpose of comparison, the body as it enters a stage 
or state of relaxation, of which sleep is a type, or, say, certain states 
induced through yoga (that is, feedback), or hibernation, there is 
indeed reduced “oxygen utilization”; but the language of “Again in 
the Black Cloud” points to “the appearance of paroxysmal potentials” 
with an increase in beta-waves which will be followed by (massive) 
synchronization.  As  Henry  Ey  observes:  “Whereas  the  mass  of 
cerebal  neurons  pulsate  partially  and  in  succession,  massive 
‘synchronization’ forms the essence of the epileptic state. This state is 
expressed by two fundamental phenomena: convulsions and loss of 
consciousness.”
129 Now let us consider the way in which Ey puts the 
neurophysiological material in phenomenological and epistemological 
terms to explain the significance of the destructuring of the field of 
consciousness in the zone of sleep: 
 
 
128 J.F. Stein, “Sleep, EEG, Reticular System,” An Introduction to Neurophysiology 
(Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1982), 301. Thanks are here due 
to Ms. (now Dr.) Jessica Ruth Harris, sometime medical student in Gonville 
and Caius College, who suggested Stein as a guide. 
129 Henri Ey, “The Neurobiology of the Field of Consciousness,” Consciousness, 
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Everything takes place as if sleeping and waking were not 
simple states, but involved an unfolding of events which 
was  regulated  by  the  process  of  organization, 
disorganization, and reorganization of the brain. When the 
individual stops organizing his field of consciousness in its 
verticality  and  the  facultativity  of  the  movements  which 
allow him to adapt to reality, he the vacillates in sleep. In 
sleep  he  can  abandon  himself  to  the  annihilation  of  a 
world, where a dream, as an instantaneous flux, appears 
only  to  disappear;  or  can  again  set  himself  up  as  an 
“analogue” of the world. It thus seems that the brain itself 
“overturns” its own organization [setting itself off from] the 
order of “worldly” time and space.
130 
 
It is precisely the destructuration of the levels of hierarchy inherent in 
the  intentional  activity  of  consciousness  that  “Again  in  the  Black 
Cloud” depicts in order, then, to become open to the neurological 
field as model of autonomy, there where “Damage makes perfect,” on 
the threshold of paroxysmal potentials, of neurological crisis – a grand 
mal attack.  “Damage  makes perfect:” and the colon introduces the 
direct quotation as though the ensuing description would explain, as 
though forming a seam between “perfect” and what follows.  What, 
though, could perfection be? What is lost in order that there may be 
another kind of gain, the spending of which will be “damage mended 
/ and ended”? (WR 21 / 231) There is suggestion from Ey which may 
assist  here  when  he  comments  that  “The  lived  experience  of 
dreaming during sleep is the reverse of the real and, as E.C. Crosby 
pointed out, is the reverse of emotional expression. It unfolds in a 
closed  and  imaginary  space  ‘outside  the  law’  and  in  a  sort  of 
gratification of pure emotion.”
131 
  At which point, the parallelism (of discourse, of the subject, of 
the Zwischenbereich, of time, of experience) inherent in “Again in the 
Black  Cloud”  takes  on  a  new  significance  with  hints  of 
temporal/topographical regression pointing to hallucination: 
 
 
130 Henri Ey, “The Neurobiology of the Field of Consciousness,” Consciousness, 
181. 
131  Henry  Ey,  “The  Neurobiology  of  the  Field  of  Consciousness,” 
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    the reverse signs of memory and dream 
 
and the implied dissolution of secondary psychical processes for the 
directing of cathexes of ‘attention’ onto the external world, hence: 
 
       And constantly the 
    child line dips into sleep, the 
more than countably infinite hierarchy of 
    higher degree causality conditions  
setting the reverse signs of memory and dream. 
       “Totally confused most of the time” —is 
        the spending of gain  
        or damage mended 
          and ended, aged, the 
        shouts in the rain 
         
and we are returned, again, to the synaesthetic states of the vocal 
world (“the /  shouts in the rain”) both in Day Light Songs (“  the 
shouts  are  /  against  nothing  we  all  /  stand  at  variance  /  we  walk 
slowly if it / hurts we rant,” Poems, 29) and the opening of “Again in 
the Black Cloud”: “Falling loose with a grateful hold, / of the sounds 
towards  purple,”  the  implied  “aimless  wandering,”  and  “dizziness” 
now  related  to  “Totally  confused  most  of  the  time,”
132  with  the 
implied rapid saccadic rhythms of movement into and out of, below 
and  above,  mimicking  the  various  layers  of  sleep  (primitive  sleep, 
hypnagogia)  or  the  breaks  in  and  out  of  awareness  of  defective 
consciousness of which epilepsy, on Hughling Jackson’s model, is the 
type.  As  Ey,  the  great  modern  disciple  of  Hughlings  Jackson 
comments,  “Epilepsy  makes  it  exceptionally  clear  that  the  state  of 
unconsciousness is no more a simple and homogeneous state than is 
wakefulness or sleep. Unconsciousness admits of a series of levels of 
loss of structure, which epilepsy brings to light.”
133 The poem seems 
to  be  over-boarded  with  the  densities,  pressures  and  impacts  of 
 
132 Cf. Ey’s extended description on “the twilight states, auras, and attacks of 
psychomotor  automatisms  which  occur,”  along  with  “the  electrical 
‘conflagration’” and “cerebral hurricane and paroxysmal hypersynchrony” in 
epilepsy just short of psychical dissolution, in “The Neurobiology of the Field 
of Consciousness,” Consciousness, 182-183. 
133  Henry  Ey,  “The  Neurobiology  of  the  Field  of  Consciousness,” 
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change, movement and threshold phenomena in such a manner that 
awareness would seem to be not the containment of a subject but 
rather the articulation of an autonomously structured field of process, 
motion and powers.  
  Here  we  return  to  the  theme  of  liminality  and  the  precision 
which  we  made  that  the  domain  presented  here  is  that  of  the 
representation  of  the  experience  of  electrical  charges  across  the 
synapses,  for  we  can  observe,  not  only  the  intrinsic  link  between 
syntax and movement and color.  The color predicates not only open 
into a given literary history, but become the means through which the 
concern  with  equivalent  descriptions  (at  the  heart  of  this  poem)  is 
embodied:  color-consciousness;  color  conceived  as  particle-wave; 
color  as  richness  so  full  as  to  be  debilitating  (as  deployed,  for 
example, in Valéry’s great sonnet “Le bois amical” which renders the 
drunkenness of being as “La Lune amicale aux insensées”); color in 
the  field  as  without  measure.  In  some  respects,  it  is  as  though  the 
thinking  of  the  poem  dismisses  –  congédie  –  the  problem  of 
ventriloquism in favor of a more radical approach to process, for if, in 
relation to the representation of “Again in the Black Cloud,” it were 
asked: “What is the source for the voice in action?” it would have to be 
said that no answer could be forthcoming.  The question leads to the 
question  of  the  absence  of  subject.  Actions  (not  persons)  seem  to 
occupy the grammatical position of active voice: 
 
  “Shouts rise again”, “flecks of cloud skim over to storm-light” 
 
and we are not provided with any stabilizing of vision or framework 
of enunciation which would master the experience, especially where 
animation, active voice is given to “the  white bees” which “swarm 
out of the open voice gap.”  What a moment of almost cold, lyric 
beauty, a beauty of stasis, fit for a Magritte:  the open voice gap.  Again 
“the hour / is crazed by fracture,” not that the hour itself fractures.  
And when the position of active voice is assumed by a pronoun that 
could passably be that of personhood, it is only to enter a question, 
the sphere of the problematic — 
   
         Who can see what he loves, 
      again or before, as the injury shears 
        past the curve of recall, the field 
      double-valued at the divine point. 
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This is apophatic expression, negative capability. Who, indeed, can 
see, observe, make tangible, that which is constitutive of his utmost 
nature . . .? where “the field / [becomes] double-valued at the divine 
point”: this reflexive moment, or rather, the implied impossibility of 
this  reflexive  moment  being  capable  of  becoming  an  object  of 
attention, nevertheless, defines: something of the nature of value: the 
double-value spoken of here could, I suggest, tie into the double-value 
of quantum physics already alluded to in the expression “equivalent 
description” whereby some ‘x’ can be described either as a particle or 
as a wave without, and this is the crucial point, being able to be any 
the wiser about ontological commitment. This double-value is, too, 
the  double-value  of  the  synaesthesia  of  cross-matching  modalities, 
where  physical  movement  can  be  color  in  “Falling  loose  with  a 
grateful hold / of the sounds towards purple,” where sound can be 
taste (as in the onset of epilepsy), or even where a defective capacity 
or consciousness can be an opening (“this cross-/matching of impaired 
attention” as “a pure joy,” (WR 21 / 231). It is, too, the double-valued 
“equivalent  descriptions”  of  (i)  medical  discourse  and  (ii)  the 
experience of the subject of that medical discourse.  No doubt I could 
describe  my  experience  of  heart-attack  or  epileptic  discharge  in 
medico-technical terms (Hughlings Jackson’s Z was after all a young 
medical doctor), however unlikely. 
  This is where the Heideggerians say that we are here presented 
with a language of science as an abstraction practiced upon the body 
(conceived  by  science  as  neural  matter,  hyle),  the  treatment  of  a 
subject reduced to a condition of oppressive potentiality, being no more 
than  a  potential  subject  of  technological  discourse  -  “the  violence  of 
abstraction”  and  “the  abstraction  of  violence”  in  Heideggerian 
discourse.
134 
  Given  the  prevalence  (dominance?)  of  passive  voice 
construction in “Again in the Black Cloud” and Wound Response, one 
might ask, what are the means by which, what are the grounds on 
which, a reconnection could be made with the activity of the subject 
 
134  Cf.  Martin  Heidegger,  Zollikon  Seminars,  ed.  Medard  Boss  (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 19-20, and which may be compared 
with Bergson’s account of Greek science and place (lieu, khora) in Aristotle in 
comparison  with  the  concept  of  space  in  modern  science  as  founded  by 
Galileo.  Cf.  Henri  Bergson,  L’Evolution  créatrice  (1907)  (Paris:  PUF,  1966), 
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such that we have movement (kinesis) as well as change (metabolé)? 
This is the question, the key question, it can be said, upon which the 
discussions of Touch, Heat and Pain land and which is central to “Of 
Movement Towards a Natural Place” where, quoting Touch, Heat and 
Pain, the question is formulated in terms of  
 
                     “a 
detecting mechanism must integrate across that  
population.” 
 
Here is the context in which the statement appears in the discussions 
of  Touch,  Heat  and  Pain.  The  passage  quoted  in  “Of  Movement 
Towards  a  Natural  Place”  appears  in  the  “General  Discussion  of 
Section IV” of Touch, Heat and Pain devoted to “Central Integration 
over Neural Space” (Touch, Heat and Pain, 291-296). V.B. Mountcastle 
opens the discussion with the following question:  
 
I would like to put a theoretical question to the experts on 
temperature.  Let  us  consider  the  central  detecting 
mechanism looking at the input from the different fibres. 
How do you conceive that the central mechanism reads 
the  precise  temperature  when  frequencies  may  be 
identical at two different temperatures, on such a double-
ended  curve  […]?  One  hypothesis  is  that  it  is  a  spatial 
affair and the detector discriminates neurons distributed 
in neural space which when integrated signal warmth, but 
this makes it much more complicated for the central mechanism.  
(Touch, Heat and Pain, 291. My emphases.) 
 
The question is nominally about temperature, its nociception, but is 
implicitly  about  agency  and  the  role  or  otherwise  of  a  subject’s 
response to pain. To Mountcastle’s question, Hensel replies that “In a 
large  population  of,  say,  cold  fibres,  the  curve  of  increasing  total 
frequency is extended to much lower temperatures. In this case the 
integrated response of the whole population of cold receptors rises 
until quite a low temperature is reached and then falls of rapidly.” 
(Touch, Heat and Pain,  291.)  If there is not a  “reciprocally oriented 
integrated response for warmth,” then, says Mountcastle, “This opens 
up  the  more  difficult  question  of  how  the  central  neural  detecting 
mechanism  integrates  across  neural  space.”  (Touch,  Heat  and  Pain, 
291.) Zotterman interjects the telling question to Hensel, asking him Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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“are you sure […] that the integrated response has anything to do with 
what we experience, because it is a low frequency? It may be that we 
experience only the phasic (dynamic) response.” (Touch, Heat and Pain, 
291. My emphases.) The distinguished neuroscientist Sir John Eccles 
was also a member of the discussion throughout Touch, Heat and Pain, 
and at this point in the debate he asks: “Professor Mountcastle, what 
exactly do you mean by neural space?” (Touch, Heat and Pain, 292) 
which receives the answer (drawn upon by “Of Movement Towards 
a Natural Place”): 
 
By  this  I  mean  that  neural  transformation  of  real  space 
which  may  be  identical  with  it  or  may  be  some 
topologically preserved transform of it. For example, if the 
arm is stimulated, there must be a distribution of neurons 
within  the  arm  area  of  the  cortex  which  represents  the 
space of that arm. In order to integrate the input from this 
area and read its temperature, a detecting mechanism must 
integrate  across  that  population,  as  Professor  Hensel 
suggests,  and  that  is  not  an  easy  matter  for  which  to 
suggest a reasonable model.  
(Touch, Heat and Pain, 292.) 
 
Eccles seeks to make the case that when there is talk of “warm” and 
“cold” fibres at some point there must also be talk of what is “actually 
experienced” (Touch, Heat and Pain, 292), in terms of temporal delays 
of  approximately,  say,  one-fifth  of  a  second.  Mountcastle  insists, 
however, that 
 
There is a mystery in the case of temperature sensation, 
because to derive intensity in this case, spatial integration is 
necessary,  whereas  for  many  other  forms  of  sensation, 
where there are monotonic curves, is it is not. By looking 
at the input from one part of the neural field you cold not 
tell  what  the  temperature  is.  This  is  not  true  for  many 
other forms of sensation.  
(Touch, Heat and Pain, 292-93.) 
 
As the questions become more basic, more fundamental – “Surely, 
says Professor Gray, this is not a fundamental problem” (Touch, Heat 
and  Pain,  293)  –  the  responses  become  curiously  telling  in  their 
simplicity: “No one, says, Mountcastle, knows anything about how GLOSSATOR 2 
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populations of neurons integrate spatially”; and Zotterman, in turn, 
returns to the basic, “How do we judge temperature?” (Touch, Heat 
and Pain, 293) in order to demonstrate the relativity of temperature – 
and by implication what has been called the puzzle of pain.
135 There 
is, indeed, humor in thi s kind of conference talk when seen on the 
page, and some of this passes over quietly into the ironism at work in 
“Of Movement Towards a Natural Place,” and which comes to the 
fore in “The Plant Time Manifold Transcripts.” It remains, though, that 
the questions of agency, nociception (cognition at the neural level), 
place and language are important fundamental questions and are so 
taken by Prynne as models. The problem, for example, of a central 
detecting  mechanism  that  integrates  across  neural  space  can  be 
understood,  and,  on  the  argument  of  this  commentary,  is  so 
understood  in  the  poetry  of  Prynne,  as  posing  the  problem  of  an 
internal  mechanism  which  may  be  capable  of  some  kind  of 
intelligence, and which, furthermore, as part of and yet in some way 
apart form a large neural network may be understood not merely as a 
means  by  which  sensation  is  registered  but  as  itself  a  form  of 
communication the form of which is the CNS. Why, then, might one 
not  be  able  to  construe  such  a  central  detecting  mechanism,  self-
reproducing and self-organizing – the very definition of autonomy, 
even within a hierarchical model of autonomy such as found in the 
work of an Ey – as a form of non-linguistic communication? And if 
this central detecting mechanism that integrates across populations of 
neural space is itself the material basis for the internal representation 
of self-observation so characteristic of certain states like hypnagogia, 
or the sense of separated and doubling awareness – “See him recall 
the day by moral trace,” opens “Of Movement Toward a Natural 
Place,” and “He sees his left wrist rise to tell him the time”? For not 
the least significant aspect of the discussion in Touch, Heat and Pain, 
especially that between Mountcastle and Eccles, is that even within 
neural  networks  there  is  a  need  for  representation  –  not  merely 
information - that is, some kind of second-order activity. Let’s look 
again at Mountcastle’s response to Eccles’ question “What do you 
mean by neural space?” 
 
 
135 Cf. Ronald Melzack, The Puzzle of Pain (New York: Basic Books, 1973), but 
also the pioneering book by Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and 
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By  this  I  mean  that  neural  transformation  of  real  space 
which  may  be  identical  with  it  or  may  be  some 
topologically preserved transform of it. For example, if the 
arm is stimulated, there must be a distribution of neurons 
within  the  arm  area  of  the  cortex  which  represents  the 
space of that arm.  
(Touch, Heat and Pain, 292.) 
 
There could be no clearer expression of the role of representation – 
and in part for the poetics of Wound Response, the role of language – at 
the smallest levels, there where the field of the human opens onto 
non-human but sentient presence. Here we might also be enabled to 
understand the design of the cover of Wound Response (fig.1) in relation 
to the discourse of pain and varying thresholds explored in  Touch, 
Heat and Pain (fig.2) where the rectangular block of Wound Response 
(fig.)  evokes  the  rectangular  block  of  (fig.2)  and  its  quantitative 
function of marking and registering a pain threshold (in particular in 
relation to the skin, but this latter is not the main or exclusive point 
for Wound Response). The explanation of the diagram from Touch, Heat 
and Pain reads: “Relative concentrations of P, P* and Pn in the steady 
state  at  different  tissue  temperatures.  ‘Pain  threshold’  refers  to  the 
relative  concentration  of  P*  for  steady  non-adapting  pain.”  (J.D. 
Hardy and J.A.J. Stolwijk, “Tissue Temperature and Thermal Pain,” 
in Touch, Heat and Pain, 44.) The constants, P and P*, are, however, 
inferred and stand for “the relative concentrations of some natural 
‘inactivated’ protein complex.” (Hardy and Stolwijk, in  Touch, Heat 
and Pain, 40.) This is the obscurity of which W. Ritchie Russell spoke 
in his contemporaneous review of the Ciba Foundation conference 
and accompanying volume, where fundamental questions lead to the 
need  for  new  formulations  and  languages  for  the  purposes  of 
representation. It is at this level of questioning, gathered together in 
the conception of place as neural space, that the neurological field and 
the poetic field are conjoined in “The relation between ‘joy’ and ‘field’ 
as they resolve into the idea of paradise.”
136 Wound Response, that is to 
say,  is  the  occasion  in  Prynne’s  oeuvre  where,  going  forward,  the 
conception of the poetic field was definitively re-structured in terms of 
and  by  the  neurological  field  as  model,  above  all,  as  model  of 
 
136 J.H. Prynne, “A Pedantic Note in Two Parts,” The English Intelligencer, 2
nd 
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autonomy in which passivity is accorded an epistemologically pivotal 
role. 
  The question of  agency  figured in neurological  terms  gives a 
deep  temporality  of  nature/cosmos,  one  that  poses  the  question  in 
terms  of  a  non-intentional  universe,  and  this  is  the  conception  of 
autonomy at which  Wound  Response aims:  to say that it would be 
impossible to say or know what such a discourse might be like is not 
the point. Suppose, rather, that one permitted one’s discourse to be 
thus regulated, what  models  might there be from which to choose?  
First, the language of quantum physics, what we have already alluded 
to as the language of equivalent descriptions of which the wave-particle 
construction is but a paradigm. We do not, though, have to go as far 
as such abstruse fictions as  are to be formed in quantum physics, 
closer to home, closer, indeed, to one’s self, is the experience of the 
body under certain types of description — thus, the autonomous nervous 
system, the genesis, development and circulation of disease, or, as we 
have  studied  here,  neurological  damage  or  heightened  states  as 
explored in Hölderlin, Büchner, Trakl, Celan, and Prynne. A limiting 
case might be to observe the effect of feedback (Yoga, for example) 
on  the  autonomous  nervous  system  to  that  point  where 
suggestion/intention fails giving experience over to a curious dualism 
(of equivalent descriptions):  the body moving as through without a 
subject, yet a “subject” being able to cognize such movement as a 
passive  spectator,  indeed,  a  subject  which,  at  a  given  point  will 
converge  with  the  moving  autonomy  of  this  inside  experience,  the 
limiting case of which would be the re-cognition of the approach of 
one’s own death. That is, where in the one all is happening, effect, the 
subject’s convergence with this happening is also itself an effect. In 
each of these forms subjectivity is radically reduced almost to a zero 
point condition – consider, again, Ey’s allusion to E.C. Crosby on the 
lived  experience  of  dreaming  during  sleep  as  the  reverse  of  emotional 
experience  -  a  condition  for  changes  in  modes  of  attention  for  the 
emergence  of  the  new  through  attention  (whence  the  language  of 
surprise  and  “pure  joy”).  To  a  zero  point  condition.  Is  this  an 
inhuman discourse, part of the much trumpeted destruction of the 
‘subject’ of which postmodernism once saw itself as the celebration? I 
think not. It is part of an essay in a non-human discourse, and as such 
Prynne’s  poetics  cannot  possibly  be  comprehended  in  humanistic 
terms. I allow myself to recount the following exchange from many 
years ago with Prynne in his rooms in Gonville and Caius. Prynne 
spoke  of  attending  Elizabeth  Anscombe's  inaugural  professorial Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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lecture at Trinity, Cambridge - the author of the very important work 
on  Intention  (1957)  -  in  which  she  floated  the  possibility,  and 
meaningfulness, of a universe of non-intentional discourse, at which 
point, said Prynne, his ears pricked up and he began to listen, well, 
intently, only to hear Anscombe blow off the suggestion as something 
about  which  one  could  not  easily  meaningfully  speak.  In  Wound 
Response, it is by no means obvious that the language of science is 
merely the objectifying methodology that Heidegger says it is, though 
the language of objectification is indeed explored in Prynne’s oeuvre 
for the question of what such a discourse might be like if regulated 
however tenuously by the idea of a non-intentional universe which 
finds  its  models  not  merely  in  scientific  discourse,  but  closest  to 
discourse of the body. In this respect Prynne (and Breton, I should 
also  argue,  as  understood  by  a  Blanchot)  in  his  exploration  of 
passivity  explores  the  non-human  at  the  point  where  human 
subjection  coincides  and  overlaps  with  non-human  temporalities: 
language,  natures,  cosmos  encountered  through  the  fascinating 
hinterland of neurology: for its spontaneity, for its materiality, yet the 
impossibility  of  reductivist  explanation  which  leaves  open  the 
metaphoric  projective  potency  inherent  to  the  human  mind  and 
language, and thereby, it can be argued, the juncture of immanence 
and  transcendence  without  the  need  for  ontological  commitment. 
That point is reached, then, where obscurity is constructive, “the field 
/ double-valued at the divine point.”  That point wherein the strictest 
language  of  science  (mathematical  quantum  physics)  fails  in  its 
desire/ability  to  ascribe  ontological  commitment,
137  where  the 
germinal  matrix  of  molecular  biology  is  a  paradigm  case  of 
potentiality (of which the current metaphorical usage of khora may be 
no more than an image), or wherein the language of medicine fails to 
touch the self-experience of pathological failure, that point 
 
          —out in the 
               snow-fields the aimless beasts 
mean what they do, so completely the shout 
        is dichroic in gratitude, 
       half-silvered,  
 
 
137 Though increasingly, physicists are coming to think of the particles and 
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where, that is, poetic experience and poetic language are now made 
subject to the phenomenology of transition, passage, the lyric field as 
Zwischenbereich. At the very moment where poetic experience would 
herald  dissolution,  this  work  seems  to  be  saying,  there  begins  the 
problem  of  subjection  (the  medium  of  passage/transition),  at  the  point 
where the problem of agency comes forward, there, and only there, 
suggest the poetics of Wound Response, can the question of imagining 
the emergence of the new be intelligible, and with it the struggle for 
the language of intelligibility – for this, the temporality of the body as 
the middle term in the open, the field of the Between, between human 
subjectness and nature, nature and the cosmos, is the starting place 
for  the  comprehension  of  the  way  in  which  the  new,  that  is, 
intelligibility – fiction - is generated in the asymptotic mirror of the 
old, La joie de se trouver devant une chose neuve, “a pure joy at a feeble 
joke.” Reality as process and play. 
 
Beyond help it is a joy at death itself: 
a toy hard to bear, laughing all night. 
 
    The Oval Window, 34 / 339. 
 
After feints the heart steadies, 
pointwise invariant, by the drown’d 
light of her fire. In the set course 
we pass layer after layer, loving 
what we still know. It is 
an estranged passion, but true, 
the daughter willed back by blue eyes, 
unscathed, down the central 
pathway. Timelike delirium 
cools at this crossing, with your head 
in my arms. The ship steadies 
and the bird also; from frenzy 
to darker fields we go. 
 
    Into the Day, (closing / Poems, 214) 
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APPENDIX: 
THE TIME OF THE SUBJECT IN THE NEUROLOGICAL FIELD 
(II): A NOTE ON BRETON IN THE LIGHT OF PRYNNE 
 
A part of my morning was spent conjugating a new tense 
of the verb to be – since a new tense of the verb to be had 
just been invented. 
      André Breton, “Rêve,” Littérature, nouvelle série,  
      no.7, 1 December, 1922 
  The two main shadows over the future tense 
      J.H. Prynne, The Oval Window 
138 
 
… for it is at the place [endroit] where man seems on the point of 
finishing  that  probably  he  begins.  This  luminous  phrase, 
suggested to Maurice Maeterlinck by the study of the work 
of this exquisite Novalis, could be stamped out in letters on 
the standard [flag, oriflamme] of contemporary poetry.
139 
 
I should like to make an extended comparison of Prynne’s poetics of 
experience with a particular aspect of Breton’s poetics of experience, 
the  Breton  who  was  a  student  in  medical  psychiatry  and  whose 
conception of Surreality owes much to the medical and neurological 
literature of his youth dealing with the aphasias (Charcot), mental 
automatism  (Maury,  Freud)  and  the  autonomous  la  parole  intérieure 
(Egger).
140 The Surrealist Breton might, with reason, be seen as in 
 
138 J.H. Prynne, The Oval Window, 11 /  Poems, 316. 
139  Tancrède  de  Visan,  “Maurice  Maeterlinck  et  les  images  successives,” 
L’Attitude du lyrisme contemporain (Paris: Mercure de France, 1911), 97. 
140  In  the  very  text,  “Le  Message  automatique”  (1933),  in  which  Breton 
famously wrote that “L’histoire de l’ecriture automatique dans le surrealisme 
serait, je ne crains pas de le dire, celle d’une infortune continue” [The history 
of  automatic  writing  in  Surrealism  would  be,  I  do  not  fear  to  say  it,  a 
continuous misfortune], Breton, as part of his persistent attempt to deepen the 
historical  and  theoretical  conception  of  Surrealist  automatic  experience, 
would also give a detailed historiographic and critical review of the French 
and  German  literature  on  the  pathology  and  psychophysiology  of 
autonomous experience in relation to language, vision, and listening (l’écoute 
surréaliste).  Cf.  André  Breton,  “Le  Message  automatique,”  Oeuvres  complètes, 
volume II (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 375-392. Among the texts discussed by 
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some  way  a  Romantic  of  the  Jena  mode,  and  this  would  not  be 
wholly  unfair,  whilst  Prynne,  surely,  would  be  more  properly 
Baroque, that is, Bach rather than Novalis. (But let us not forget that 
Novalis wrote that great proto-Surrealist work Monolog that begins: 
“There is something mad in language …”.) This could be argued, but 
there  is  a  place  where  they  may  be  seen  thinking,  and  deeply 
meditating on a comparable problem: that problem is the nature of 
agency  and  the  inner  temporality  of  the  subject,  and  the  place  is 
neurology  mediated  through  nature,  that  is,  the  neurology  of 
heightened  states  and  the  experience  of  liminality  especially  in 
relation to color predication. 
  Above, we concentrated upon Hughlings Jackson’s conception 
of epileptic discharge as an aspect of the model at work in “Again in 
the Black Cloud.” It is important to observe that the epileptic state is 
not  a  psychotic  state  –  one  of  the  dominant  models  for  Surrealist 
writing and art production - it is, however, close to a family of états 
secondaires important to the Surrealists of which the hypnagogic state is 
the determinant example for Surrealism, the state par excellence which 
captures, visually, acoustically and verbally, the meaning of passivity, 
transition and passage for Surrealist experience and which also helps 
one  to  understand  why  the  Surrealists  could  not  meaningfully 
distinguish automatist from oneiric modes of articulation, for which it 
was their great aim to find a common source. The founding speech of 
Surrealism is the utterance Il y a un homme coupé en deux par la fenêtre 
…(There is man cut in two by a window…) which came to Breton as 
he  was  falling  asleep,  i.e.,  in  a  hypnagogic  state:  image  and  word 
articulated  in  the  absence  of  sound,  but  not,  as  Breton  reported, 
bereft  of  the  murmur.  Breton  gives  a  first  public  account  of  the 
condition which led to this utterance in “Entrée des médiums” first 
published in the new series of Littérature in 1922: 
 
In  1919,  my  attention  was  fixed  upon  –  [literally,  had 
affixed itself, become fixed upon] – phrases more or less 
partial  which,  in  complete  solitude,  at  the  approach  of 
 
Breton, especially relevant to this study are Victor Egger, La Parole intérieure: 
Essai  de  psychologie  descriptive  (Paris:  Germer  Baillière  et  Cie,  1881);  Pierre 
Quercy,  Les  Hallucinations  (Paris:  Félix  Alcan,  1936),  and  Pierre  Quercy, 
L’Hallucination, vol. I: Philosophes et mystiques, vol. II: Etudes cliniques (Paris: Félix 
Alcan, 1930). Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
237 
sleep, became palpable  [perceptible] to the  mind without 
for  all that the  mind being  able  to  discover  a precedent 
reason for them […] It is later that Soupault and I dreamt 
of reproducing in us the state where they became formed.
141  
 
This passage is re -taken in the  Manifeste  in  1924,  but  with  greater 
attention  to  the  texture  of  the  experience  in  which,  about  to  fall 
asleep, says Breton, 
 
I perceived fully articulated to such an extent that it was 
impossible to change a word of it, but abstracted, however, 
from the sound of all voice, a quite bizarre phrase […] a 
phrase I would dare to say which was knocking at the window-
pane […] it was something like: “There is a man cut in two 
by the window.”
142 
 
 The utterance is famously  unfinished, incomplete and,  as it were, 
interrupted, and the lack intrinsic to this founding utterance  - this 
instituting fragment - is structurally and typologically characteristic of 
the hypnagogic state,  that state which  the great nineteenth-century 
psychopathologist  Alfred  Maury  described  as  un  état  intermédiaire,  a 
state which places one “en présence d'une décomposition ou d'une 
suspension  de  la  pensée  voisine  de  la  mort”  (in  the  presence  of  a 
decomposition or of a suspension of thought bordering on [close to] 
death.)
143  The  hypnagogic  and  the  epileptic  states  m ay  both  be 
regarded as forms of hypnoid conditions in which the subject finds 
itself in a different if parallel causality from the actions it may observe 
the point of origin of which is not merely “outside” the subject but 
independent  of  the  subject  in  another  autonomous  field  of 
structuration.  From  Breton  and  the  Surrealists  through  Samuel 
Beckett  –  with  parallel  developments  in  philosophy  (Bergson, 
Cassirer,  Merleau-Ponty),  linguistics  (Jakobsen),  and  history  of 
philosophy (Canguilhem) – up to the work of Prynne, the problem of 
 
141 Cf. André Breton, “Entrée des médiums” (1922), in Les Pas perdus (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1924), rpd. in Oeuvres complètes, I (Paris: Gallimard, 1988), 274. My 
emphasis. 
142 André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme (1924), in Oeuvres complètes, I, 324-325.  
143 André Maury, “De certains faits observés dans les rêves et dans l'état 
intermédiaire entre le sommeil et la veille,” Annales médico-psychologiques, vol. 3, 
(1857), 158. My emphasis.  GLOSSATOR 2 
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an agency or autonomous structuration has been resituated from the 
cosmological dimension, where it was first situated by Romanticism, 
to  language,  and  in  particular  to  language  mediated  by  the 
neurological field in such a way that language and attention – modes 
of attending, or the breakdown of the internal capacities of attention – 
became the terms of articulation for a poetics no longer merely about 
the  craft  of  verse.  Hence  the  turn  to  liminal  examples  –  the 
hypnagogic,  the  epileptoid,  the  narcotic  -  but  always  negotiated  in 
relation to language as itself a liminal phenomenon explored by the 
Surrealists in such a way as to  seem  to  tear apart  expression and 
representation - the articulations we call discursive formations – even 
as they are necessary moments (aspects, in the linguistic term) of an 
act: one is not superior to the other, though it can fairly be said that 
Surrealism  was  concerned  more  with  the  expressive  moment  of 
representation since failure at the discursive level necessarily pointed 
either to distortion (social and psychological) or to some aspect of the 
expressive medium as flawed (in the neurological sense, for example) 
which  may  then  become  paradigmatic  for  alternative  modes  of 
attention. Indeed, what is fascinating in the Surrealist valorization of 
psychosis is not the vulgarity “We should all be mad,” rather it is the 
realization that there obtains in such conditions alternative patterns of 
concept-formation  and  attending  and  thereby  different  forms  of 
signification, for the articulation of which language is in some way 
determinant.  Hence  Freud,  and  Lacan  following  Freud,  making 
paranoia  and  the  use  of  language  in  paranoia,  the  transition,  the 
middle  term,  between  neurosis  and  psychosis  proper.  It  is  this 
emphasis upon the pathologically derived modes of attention that the 
poetics  of  Surrealist  experience  share  with  the  medically  inflected 
poetics  of  liminality  explored  in  Wound  Response.  Consider,  for 
example,  that  in  the  letters  that  the  young  medical  intern  Breton 
wrote  to  his  fellow  student,  and  soon  to  be  doctor  and  Dadaist, 
Théodore  Frankel  after  his  encounter  with  Freud  as  reported  in 
Régis’  Précis de psychiatrie and subsequently in Régis and Hesnard’s 
considerable book La Psychoanalyse des névroses et des psychoses (1914), it 
was precisely this dimension of the structuration of the attention that 
fascinated him in the cases of psychoses. Particularly revealing are 
some of the passages that Breton copies out of books which he is 
reading in order to convey his excitement to Fraenkel. The following 
passage, alluding to Pascal’s La Démence précoce (1911), for example, 
deals with the importance of structuration by association: 
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The disturbances [or, disorders] in the association of ideas 
in dementia praecox patients are reducible to disturbances 
in the power of the cohesionof psychic elements.  Often, in 
poetry, there are associations by assonances, by contrasts, 
etc., and stereotypes, but each word remains in harmony 
with the principle idea.
144 
 
The power of internal cohesion is the faculty of attention; but, Breton 
seems to be saying, the diverse means of association in poetry provide 
many models of internal cohesion. To this extent, the experience of 
attention is not distinct from the figures and prosodic movements 
which structure poetry - but this is not, though, as it might appear, to 
say something distinctive about the craft of writing verse. It is, rather, 
a step in the direction of loosening the (energic) relations between the 
notionally psychopathological and the normal; this Breton will do by 
first, as our references to the work of Hughlings Jackson show, 
through  a  critical  attention  to  the  lack  of  clear,  unequivocal 
demarcation between consciousness and absence of consciousness, by 
scrutinizing the relations, at the level of desire, in  états secondaires or 
intermediate states, between dream and waking life in which, it can be 
seen,  the  forms  of  attending  are  not  in  principle  without  their 
distinctive organization marked by logics of separation - though what 
may be different from the everyday world of reason and habit, and 
radically so, is the intensity of movement of attention as objects are 
brought in and out of focus of interest – the economy of the cathexes, 
in  other  words,  or,  in  the  language  of  Wound  Response,  that  state 
wherein “We are bleached in sound as it burns by what / we desire” 
(WR 5 / 216). For Breton, in his developing theory of knowledge, as 
he himself terms it on many occasions, the experience of different 
forms of attention would be a prerequisite for what a change in form 
of life might be, whereas for Prynne, it is a means for investigating 
the  limits  of  language  and  representation  as  part  of  a  poetic 
epistemology  of  life.
145  The  work  of  neurology  was  crucial  for 
 
144  André  Breton  to  Théodore  Fraenkel,  27  September  1916,  quoted  in 
Marguerite Bonnet, André Breton: Naissance de l’aventure surréaliste (Paris: José 
Corti, 1975, 1988), 109. 
145 Here cf. Bergson, “the theory of knowledge and the theory of life appears to us 
inseparable  from  each  other.”  Henri  Bergson,  “Introduction,”  L’Évolution 
creatrice, ix. Heidegger is undoubtedly important for Prynne’s poetics, but for 
Prynne’s thinking on science, it is less Heidegger than another tradition that 
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Breton’s  conceptualization  of  the  movement  of  attention,  but 
psychopathology provided something important in this direction in 
the concept of complexes, that is, repressed energy, and that to which 
it became attached in an internally coherent manner which provides a 
model of autonomous structuration which to the subject is resistant, 
opaque. If the experience of internal cohesion could be understood as 
a function of the energy of a repressed complex, then the way would 
be open to experiment intelligibly with the fluidity of attention in that 
space  wherein  attention  affixes  itself,  what  Freud  would  later 
conceptualize  as  hypercathexis:  psychopathology  would  then  be 
dissolved into a set of figures for or prosody of the movement of 
attention or, eventually, a pathology of everyday life and the forms of 
desire  as  attention  opens  onto  the  world  -  in  other  words,  a 
movement in which the structure of lyric disposition served to make 
the  world  available  to  a  sensibility  of  radical  contingency,  and  no 
where is that sense of radical contingency more clearly shown than in 
the way in which Breton deploys the structure of passivity and the 
sense of accompaniment to a consciousness becoming liminal, but not 
wholly lost, characteristic of a whole range of  états  secondaires. 
  Drawing upon the neurological typology of excessive synaptic 
firing in heightened states – which, in a telling contrastive term, is 
often a loss, a diminution – Breton could write of such a state, such an 
état secondaire, that – whether epileptic, psychotic, or hypnagogic – it is 
a condition from which, on the Surrealist definition of the image, at 
the  point  of  the  seizing  of  two  realities  otherwise  distant  and 
dissimilar, there surges “une lumière particulière, lumière de l’image.”
146 
 
needs to be engaged, that tradition running through Bergson, Whitehead… 
and up to Rupert Sheldrake. 
146 André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme, in Oeuvres complètes, I, 337. Breton’s 
emphasis. The lumière de l’image recalls, too, the language of lightning from 
Hölderlin.  Though  the  evidence  is  clear  about  the  role  of  the  culture  of 
Surrealism in the wider introduction of Hölderlin into French thought (for 
example,  the  wife  of  Pierre  Naville,  Denise  Naville,  was  the  principal 
translator of Hölderlin’s letters), many of the Surrealists, including Breton’s 
first wife, Simone Kahn, were bi-lingual French-German from Strasbourg and 
Alsace-Lorrain. Maxime Alexandre, a typical example of this configuration, 
would  write  a  fine  book  that  testifies  to  the  richness  of  this  Strasbourg 
contingent within Surrealism. Cf. Maxime Alexandre, Hölderlin le poète: étude 
critique suivie d’un Choix de Poèmes (Marseille: Robert Laffont, 1942). Breton 
himself, in his Entretiens, would go so far as to say that Hölderlin, on whom 
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Breton  here  transposes  the  neurology  of  synaptic  firing  into  a 
metaphorics of inspiration which is no longer the element of balance 
and  purity  that  is  the  aim  of  a  Pierre  Reverdy’s  (Cubist-
Construvtivist) metapoetics of balance and conception of beauty. The 
value  of  the  image,  says  Breton  using  metaphors  of  electricity, 
“depends on the beauty of the spark obtained; it is, as a result,  a 
function of the potential difference between the two conductors.” He 
continues: 
 
And just as the length of the spark gains to the extent that 
it  becomes  produced  through  rarified  gases,  so  the 
Surrealist atmosphere created by mechanical writing, that I 
have wanted to place at the disposition of all, is especially 
given to the production of the most beautiful images. It can 
even  be  said  that  the  images  appear,  in  this  vertiginous 
race, as standard-bearers of the mind. [The mind] becomes 
aware of unlimited fields [des étendues illimitées
147] where 
desires  become  manifested,  where  for  and  against 
unceasingly  become  reduced,  where  its  obscurity  [my 
emphasis] does not betray it […] It is the most beautiful of 
nights, the night of lightnings [la nuit des éclairs]: Next to it, 
the day is night.
148 
 
 
Heidegger had given a magisterial interpretation, formed the intimate link – 
the  trait  d’union  -  between  Surrealism  and  Heideggerian  thought:  “I  have 
already insisted on the possibilities of rapprochement of Surrealism with the 
thought of Heidegger on the level of myth. An intimate link [un trait d’union] 
exists: the work of Hölderlin, of which he has given a superior commentary.”  
André Breton, Entretiens (Paris: Gallimard, 1952, rpd., 1969), 258. On this 
philosophical  dimension  of  Surrealist  experience,  on  Surrealism  as  the 
experience  of  thought,  cf.  Michael  Stone-Richards,  The  Negative  Work  of 
Culture:  Breton,  Blanchot  and  the  Philosophical  Intelligence  of  Surrealism 
(forthcoming). 
147 Des étendues illimitées: in another context it can be shown that by this Breton 
intends  something  conceptually  equivalent  to  the  prepredicative 
presuppositions of logical experience. This is explored in a chapter on Breton, 
Blanchot and Derrida in my forthcoming The Negative Work of Culture: Breton, 
Blanchot and the Philosophical Intelligence of Surrealism. 
148 André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme, in Oeuvres complètes, I, 338. GLOSSATOR 2 
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“La nuit des éclairs,” writes Breton, “light darting / over and over, 
through a clear sky,” we find in  Wound Response. It has long been 
realized  that  in  certain  liminal  conditions  where  color  states 
predominate that a limiting-case had been reached in which it was not 
possible for a subject internally to distinguish the electrical firing of 
neurons  from  an  outside  that  could  be  distinct  from  the  interior 
apperception  of  the  effects  of  firing  neurons.  (The  anthropological 
literature  on  shamanistic  displacement  confirms  a  comparable 
disposition,  but  this  is  something  that  had  long  been  known  in 
Romanticism, particularly where Romanticism, as with Coleridge or 
Büchner, contemporary medicine is called upon in literary contexts.) 
In the famous scene in Büchner’s Lenz which we have already quoted 
this is the precise source of the power of the experience as Lenz finds 
himself confronted with a storm (an excessive neuronic firing whose 
disposition is such that we cannot say what is breakdown what is a 
heightened state) in which 
 
the  sun’s  rays  shone  through,  drawing  their  glittering 
swords across  the snowy slopes, so  that  a blinding light 
sliced downward from the  peak to the valley; or when the 
stormwind blew the clouds down and away, tearing into 
them a pale blue lake of sky, until the wind abated and a 
humming sound like a lullaby or the ringing of bells floated 
upwards from the gorges far below and from the tops of 
the fir trees, and a gentle red crept across the deep blue, 
and tiny clouds drifted  past on silver wings, and all the 
peaks shone and glistened sharp and clear far across the 
landscape; [...] at such moments [...] he felt as though he 
would  have  to  suck  up  the  storm  and  receive  it  within 
him.
149 
 
It is in relation to such force, such psychic violence, that the mind, on 
Breton’s account, is passive, whilst for the Prynne of “Again in the 
Black  Cloud,”  the  passivity  of  the  mind  is  a  condition  of  the 
experience: the vertiginous aspect of which Breton speaks finds its 
counterpart in the neurology of epilepsy and états secondaires; the sense 
of the infinite (the Kantian sublime) – which Breton terms, following 
 
149 Georg Büchner, Lenz, 249-250. Stone-Richards – The Time of the Subject 
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Maury, des étendues illimitées
150- pressing in, available, that is, derived 
from  the  more  phenomenologically  fundamental  sense  of  the 
indeterminate  so  very  well  captured  in  the  phrases  from  Hughlings 
Jackson’s patients who report themselves “as if in a strange place,” or 
as “in a strange country,” of a place “looking confused and seeming 
strange,” at that point where vertigo is the moment and condition of 
transition, of consciousness as transient and evanescent. Color, in its 
fundamental qualities - hue, saturation and intensity – is peculiarly 
apt to capture the rhythm and pulse of such experiences that seem 
more a matter of dimension than extension, and it is this sense of an 
available  dimensionality  –  des  étendues  illimitées  –  as  also  the  noted 
capacity of self-observation in such states that Breton seeks to capture 
in the phenomenology of passivity. 
  On  many  occasions,  though  especially  in  the  encounter  with 
Nadja, Breton avails himself of this neurologically based imagery to 
articulate the Surrealist field of experience (les champs magnetiques), but 
there is one particularly telling use, in 1934, in the essay that would 
become  the  first  chapter  of  L’Amour  fou:  “L’équation  de  l’objet 
trouvé.” In the version of this essay as published in Minotaure, Breton 
publishes  a  photograph  that  may  at  first  glance  appear  to  be  of 
lightning;  the  photograph  bears  a  legend  that  makes  the  lightning 
effect emblematic of the very activity of Surrealist inspiration, L’image, 
telle  qu’elle  se  produit  dans  l’écriture  automatique,  1934.
151  What  is 
significant about this image i s that it is not at all obvious that it is 
(simply) lightning or that it is supposed to function as simply an 
image of lightning as, in context, Breton speaks of a  solution to the 
problem  of  beauty  in  such  a  way  that  maintains  an  ambiguity 
between  the  image  of  light  as  the  result  of  a  biological  chemical 
reaction  (the  Surrealist  precipitate)  and  the  image  of  light  as 
action/lightning  (which  would  be  beauty  as  explosante-fixe),  the 
ambiguity being such as to figure communicating vessels, that is, a field 
wherein interior and exterior could not be readily distinguished the 
one from the other. Thus not only does Breton continue throughout 
his oeuvre to avail himself of the neurological typology of sudden and 
rapid  excessive  discharge,  of  neurological  convulsion,  he  uses  such 
metaphors,  in  relation  to  his  developing  account  of  passivity,  to 
define the Surrealist activity as a field of multiple agencies – and this, I 
 
150 Cf. André Breton, Manifeste du surréalisme, in Oeuvres complètes, I, 338. 
151 Cf. André Breton, “La beauté sera convulsive,” Minotaure, no.5, (1934), 10.  GLOSSATOR 2 
244 
should  like  to  suggest,  however  brief  the  comparison,  is  the  same 
neurological  terrain  as  Prynne’s  “Again  in  the  Black  Cloud”  from 
Wound Response, the very title of which gives agency over to the wound 
even as the human body might be understood as bearing this wound. 
Where  for  Breton  the  problematic  is  of  passivity  and  agency  – 
inspiration is too crude a terms that forecloses thinking – as terms of 
Hegelian relationality, for Prynne the problematic becomes passivity, 
agency and (Hölderlinian) measure within a field (l’étendue) marked 
by  the  indeterminate  and  shaped  by  cross-matching  modalities  in 
such a way that no marks of demarcation are available to distinguish 
inside and outside, nor (ontological) kinds. “Now, says Breton, it is 
not  given  to  man  to  plan  the  rapprochement  of  two  realities  so 
distant. […Rather it]  must be conceded that the two terms of the 
image are not deduced one from the other by the mind in view of the 
spark  to  be  produced  [aimed  for],  that  they  are  the  simultaneous 
product of the activity I call Surrealist, reason being limited to noting [à 
constater], and appreciating the luminous phenomenon.” 
152  Here, the terrain 
of  Büchner’s  Lenz  rejoins  the  khoric  field  of  Hughlings  Jackson’s 
neurology as a poetics of attention and experience. 
 
 
 
 
152  André  Breton,  Manifeste  du  surréalisme,  in  Oeuvres  complètes,  I,  338.  My 
emphases. 